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NOTES
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY-AN EXAMINATION OF
THE UPHEAVAL IN MINNESOTA TORT LOSS ALLOCATION
CONCEPTS
Questions concerning the proper method of allocating an injured
party's loss generate a surprising amount of litigation in Minnesota
each year. The party attempting to shift liability for an injured party's
loss must do so by claiming a right to contribution or indemnity from
another party. Unfortunately, whether contribution or indemnity is the
proper remedy is rarely certain. In an attempt to clarify this uncer-
tainty, the Minnesota Supreme Court in a 1960 decision established
specific loss allocation rules for determining whether contribution or
indemnity is appropriate. Recent years, however, have witnessed both
judicial and legislative changes in these rules. This Note traces the
historical development of contribution and indemnity up through the
changes created by the recent upheaval in Minnesota contribution and
indemnity law. In addition, this Note examines the future of contribu-
tion and indemnity in Minnesota.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court,
in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,
396 (1946).
Contribution and indemnity are remedies that distribute fault among
multiple defendants who are commonly referred to as joint or co-
tortfeasors.1 Contribution shifts only a portion of the injured party's loss
1. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc .- Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 366
n. 1 (1977) (referring to defendants as joint tortfeasors); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Subur-
ban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 386, 202 N.W.2d 268, 270 (1972) (referring to defen-
dants as co-tortfeasors).
To prevent any confusion resulting from the use of the term "joint tortfeasors," this
Note will refer to persons jointly responsible for a tort as "co-tortfeasors." The term "joint
tortfeasor" is rejected because it lacks precision. It connotes ideas that are unjustifiable,
inaccurate, and generally misleading. Although the word "joint" implies concert of action,
contribution or indemnity is awarded even in the absence of concert of action. For exam-
ple, contribution is appropriate when a single indivisible harm is sustained as a result of
separate but concurring tortious acts of two or more parties. See, e.g., Lametti v. Peter
Lametti Constr. Co., 305 Minn. 72, 232 N.W.2d 435 (1975) (owner of land and construction
company were joint tortfeasors when their combined negligence resulted in injury to 14-
year-old girl in diving accident in pond on property owner's land). Moreover, although the
word "tortfeasor" means wrongdoer, frequently the party granted contribution or indem-
nity has not committed any moral wrong, with liability being imposed vicariously or re-
sulting from the doctrine of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241
Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954) (automobile owner held liable under financial responsi-
bility statute entitled to indemnity from garage owner).
Originally, the term "joint tortfeasors" applied to those who were vicariously liable for
acting in concert to commit a trespass. For example, if one tortfeasor committed a battery
as another robbed the injured party, each could be joined in the same action and held
liable for the entire damage. The jury was not permitted to apportion the damages. The
rationale for permitting joinder in such cases is that the injured party should be allowed
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from one co-tortfeasor to another co-tortfeasor1 Indemnity, on the other
hand, shifts the injured party's entire loss from one co-tortfeasor to
another co-tortfeasor. Because of the close relationship between the
doctrines, one learned jurist has commented that "indemnity is only an
to recover on one cause of action when his injuries were caused from the single but jointly
consummated tort of the co-tortfeasors. See generally King v. Hoare, 153 Eng. Rep. 206
(Ex. 1844); Brown v. Wootton, 79 Eng. Rep. 62 (K.B.) (date not reported).
With the advent of liberal procedural codes, the term "joint tortfeasor" was extended
to encompass co-tortfeasors whose independent acts concurred to cause one individual
harm. See C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 382 nn.151-66 (2d ed. 1947).
This includes injuries arising from the concurrent negligence of two persons who harm a
third party, see, e.g., Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d
706 (1973), the vicarious liability of a master for his servant, see, e.g., Rampi v. Vevea,
229 Minn. 11, 38 N.W.2d 297 (1949) (master held liable for servant's negligent use of
master's automobile), or the breach of a common duty, see, e.g., Krengel v. Midwest
Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973) (photo-booth manufacturer,
photo-booth distributor, and department store all held to be "joint tortfeasors").
The term "joint tortfeasor" has also been used to describe injuries considered indivisi-
ble, such as the burning of a building by two negligently started fires each of which would
have caused the destruction alone. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry.,
146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). However, the term does not include those results that
by their very nature are capable of some type of logical apportionment, such as where co-
tortfeasors each pollute a stream with oil, see Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451,
247 N.W. 572 (1933), or where co-tortfeasors inflict separate gunshot wounds upon the
injured party. Cf. Le Laurin v. Murray, 75 Ark. 232, 87 S.W. 131 (1905) (plaintiff suffered
only minor injuries after being beaten by first tortfeasor, but serious injuries resulted when
he was subsequently pistol-whipped by second tortfeasor). In such cases, because of the
obvious difficulties of proof as to apportionment of damages, each co-tortfeasor is held
liable only for the injury he caused and is not jointly liable for the entire damage. See
generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAw OF TORTs § 10.1 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ToirrS §§ 46-48, 52 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See, e.g., Grothe v. Shaffer, 305 Minn. 17, 232 N.W.2d 227 (1975); Samuelson v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 287 Minn. 264, 178 N.W.2d 620 (1970); Hendrickson v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104 N.W.2d 843, 846 (1960), overruled in part.
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.l
(1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
For a general discussion of the doctrine of contribution, see W. PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ ,50; Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552
(1936); Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1170
(1941); Leflar, Contribtuion and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130
(1932); Polelle, Contribution Among Negligent Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: A Squeamish
Damsel Comes of Age, 1 Lov. CHI. L.J. 267 (1970); Turck, Contribution Between Tort.
feasors in American and German Law-A Comparative Study, 41 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 287 Minn. 264, 178 N.W.2d 620
(1970); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503, 122 N.W.2d 178
(1963); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843
(1960), overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255
N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
For a general discussion of the doctrine of indemnity, see Bohlen, supra note 2; Furnish,
Distributing Tort Liability: Contribution and Indemnity in Iowa, 52 IoWA L. REV. 31
(1966); Leflar, supra note 2; Sherk, Common Law Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 7
ARIz. L. REv. 59 (1965).
19791
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extreme form of contribution."'
Whether contribution or indemnity is the proper remedy for allocating
the injured party's loss among co-tortfeasors is rarely certain.-, Much of
the uncertainty is the result of historical anachronisms, semantic ab-
surdities, and mechanical rules that surround the doctrines of contribu-
tion and indemnity.6 Additional uncertainty in Minnesota results from
contribution and indemnity having obtained a high degree of develop-
ment prior to the recent adoption of comparative negligence' and strict
4. Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.) (Hand, C.J.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 915 (1951).
5. The uncertainty over whether contribution or indemnity is the proper remedy for
allocating the injured party's loss has engendered a lively academic debate. For specific
discussions of multiple-party loss allocation problems, see Aiken, Proportioning Compara-
tive Negligence--Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARq. L. REV.
293 (1970); Boone, Comparative Negligence: Solution or Problem?, 14 CAL. TRIAL LAW.
A.J. 17 (1975); Bouchard, Apportionment of Damages Under Comparative Negligence, 55
MASS. L.Q. 125 (1970); Braun, Contribution: A Fresh Look, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 166 (1975);
George & Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in Pure Comparative Negligence: The Multi-
party Action, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1976); Goldenberg & Nicholas, Comparative Liability
Among Joint Tortfeasors: The Aftermath of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 8 U.W.L.A. L. REv. 23
(1976); Comment, Relative Contribution Among Tortfeasors: Time for Judicial Change
of the Washington Rule?, 11 GONZ. L. REv. 179 (1975); Comment, Comparative Negligence
and Comparative Contribution in Maine: The Need for Guidelines, 24 ME. L. REv. 243
(1972); Comment, Comparative Negligence in California: Multiple Party Litigation, 7
PAC. L.J. 770 (1976); Comment, South Dakota Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act: A Problem of Interpretation?, 16 S.D. L. REV. 447 (1971); Comment, The Case for
Comparative Contribution in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 713 (1976); Note, Contribution
Act Construed-Should Joint and Several Liability Have Been Considered First?, 30 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 747 (1976); Comment, Net Recovery Comparative Negligence: The Reason-
able Alternative, 6 WiLLA Errm L.J. 551 (1970).
For more general materials which include helpful discussions of the problems of
multiple-party litigation under comparative negligence, see C. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE LOSS
DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936); C. HErr & C. HEFr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
MANUAL (1971); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974); G. WILLIAMS, JOINT TORT
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (1951); Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at
Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. Rav. 239 (1976); Prosser, Comparative Negligence,
41 CALIF. L. Rav. 1 (1953); Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.: A Survey of California Practice
Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAC. L.J. 747 (1976); 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953).
6. See Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products
Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1974), where the author states:
Because of the difference in their historical bases, it has been steadfastly
maintained that indemnity and contribution are fundamentally different doc-
trines, and therefore "full contribution" and "partial indemnity" are contradic-
tions in terms. This unswerving belief is based on historical anachronisms and
semantic quibbling and has given birth to a number of anomalies and absurdi-
ties which become apparent in the context of strict liability.
Id. at 726-27 (footnote omitted).
7. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976) (contributory negligence not bar to recovery where
negligence of individual bringing action not as great as defendant's negligence), as
amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-7, 1978 Minn. Laws 839 (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1)) (converting statute into comparative fault statute where only
[Vol. 5
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products liability." Loss allocation problems are compounded further by
the trend in tort litigation of involving multiple parties in tort actions.'
Unfortunately, the weight of this uncertainty is placed ultimately upon
contributory fault of plaintiff greater than fault of person against whom recovery sought
will bar plaintiff's recovery).
8. In 1962, the doctrine of strict products liability, fundamentally different from the
statutory "implied warranty" remedies then available, became law when Justice Traynor
convinced a majority of California's Supreme Court that an injured consumer should have
a direct remedy against the remote seller of the defective product that caused his injuries.
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). For Traynor's first judicial expression of this doctrine, see his famous concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
Among academics, the person most often associated with the notion of a separate
"nonnegligence," "nonprivity" remedy in tort is, of course, the late Dean William L.
Prosser. For a classic illustration of his position in this regard, see Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. Rav. 791 (1966). This position
eventually was incorporated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirrs § 402A (1965). The
current version of § 402A, approved in 1964, reads as follows:
§ 402A. Special Liability 9i Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
The doctrine of strict liability in tort as set out in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) ToIrS § 402A
(1965) was first discussed and approved in Minnesota in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,
278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). However, actual application of the doctrine had
to wait for subsequent cases. See, e.g., Waite v. American Creosote Works, Inc., 295 Minn.
288, 204 N.W.2d 410 (1973) (finding of strict liability because of defective power pole);
Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970) (finding of strict
liability because of defective tire).
9. See Furnish, supra note 3, at 32 ("The complexities inherent in the substance and
procedure of contribution and indemnity practice are not likely to decrease with time, for
our society today presents an increasing number of fact situations in which tort liability
may be imposed against more than one party.").
The increase in multi-party lawsuits probably results, in part, from the abolition of the
privity requirement in most tort actions; once privity is abolished, suit may be brought
not only against the party who sold the injurious product to the injured party but also
against any member of the chain of distribution who sent the product through the stream
of commerce. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333-34, 154 N.W.2d
488, 497 (1967) (privity not required in strict product liability action); Beck v. Spindler,
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the practitioner, who has received little practical assistance from the
inadequate development and enunciation of the principles underlying
contribution and indemnity. 0
In 1960, the Minnesota Supreme Court sought to clarify the guidelines
for implementing contribution and indemnity. In Hendrickson v. Min-
nesota Power & Light Co.," the court held that a common liability"
must exist between co-tortfeasors before contribution could be
awarded" and established five rules for determining when indemnity is
appropriate." Recent years, however, have witnessed an upheaval in
Minnesota tort loss allocation concepts. The reason for this upheaval is
two-fold.
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court has decided several cases that
have changed or abrogated three of Hendrickson's requirements for loss
allocation among co-tortfeasors.'0 In the area of contribution law, the
court has permitted contribution between co-tortfeasors who did not
share a common liability to the injured party.'6 Thus, whether common
liability will be required before contribution may be granted is at pres-
ent uncertain." In the area of indemnity law, the court's decisions in
three cases have created an uncertainty as to the allocation of loss under
two of Hendrickson's indemnity rules among co-tortfeasors whose liabil-
ity is based upon negligence, breach of implied warranty, or strict liabil-
ity.1"
10. See Furnish, supra note 3, at 32.
11. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., - Minn. _ -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
12. Common liability comes into existence "immediately after the acts of the tort-
feasors which give rise to a cause of action against them." Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 309-10, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951).
13. 258 Minn. at 371, 104 N.W.2d at 847.
14. Although the Hendrickson rules are set out in their entirety and discussed in notes
137-84 infra and accompanying text, the following is a summary of the five situations to
which they apply. The first is when the indemnitee proves that his liability to the injured
party is derivative or vicarious to that of the indemnitor. The second is when the indemni-
tee proves that he incurred liability at the direction of or for the indemnitor. The third
situation is when the indemnitor breached a duty owed the indemnitee, and the fourth is
when the indemnitee proves that his liability to the injured party is the result of his failure
to discover the negligence of the indemnitor. The fifth situation is when the indemnitee
proves the existence of an express contract for indemnity. See Hendrickson v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372-73, 104 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1960), overruled in part,
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11
(1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
15. For an examination of the upheaval in Minnesota loss allocation cases, see notes
207-70 infro and accompanying text.
16. See Lambertson v. Cincinnatti Corp., - Minn.-,-, 257 N.W.2d 679, 688-
89 (1977).
17. Whether Lambertson should be construed as abrogating the common liability re-
quirement in all contribution actions is discussed in notes 209-29.1 infra and accompany-
ing text.
18. See notes 230-70 infra and accompanying text.
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Second, amendments to the Minnesota comparative negligence stat-
ute alter the method in which loss will be allocated between co-
tortfeasors in causes of action arising on or after April 15, 1978." The
change in legislative tort loss allocation concepts mainly affects situa-
tions in which a co-tortfeasor is insolvent.2 " Additionally, under the new
comparative fault statute, loss is allocated among co-tortfeasors in pro-
portion to the jury's findings of relative fault regardless of the specific
type of fault alleged.
2 '
The purpose of this Note is to clarify the uncertainty created by the
recent upheaval in Minnesota tort loss allocation concepts. First, the
current status of contribution and indemnity in Minnesota will be ana-
lyzed by examining various rationales for the two doctrines,2 2 the guide-
lines that initially were established for applying the doctrines, 2: and the
changes in the law created by the recent Minnesota decisions. 21 Second,
the question of where Minnesota contribution and indemnity law is
going will be discussed.2 5 Finally, the effect of the new Minnesota com-
parative fault statute on contribution and indemnity claims will be
examined.2"
II. TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
Essentially equitable remedies,27 contribution and indemnity are not
intended to affect the rights of the injured party.? The injured party
19. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 11, 1978 Minn. Laws 839 (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02).
20. See notes 299-308 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 839 (to be codified as MINN.
STAT. § 604.01-.02); notes 303-12 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 27-41 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 83-206 intra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 207-70 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 271-96 intra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 297-314 infra and accompanying text.
27. See Huggins v. Graves, 210 F. Supp. 98, 105 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (contribution an
equitable remedy, therefore jury's verdict advisory only), att'd, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir.
1964); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Zontelli Bros., 161 F. Supp. 769, 772 (D. Minn. 1958) (contri-
bution, which has its genesis in equity, now enforceable at law), off'd, 263 F.2d 194 (8th
Cir. 1959); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 371, 104 N.W.2d
843, 847 (1960) ("In the modern view, principles of equity furnish a more satisfactory basis
for indemnity.") (footnote omitted), overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Inius., Inc., -
Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.1l (1977) (abrogating Rule 4); Employers
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 310, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693
(1951) ("Contribution is based on the simple demand of justice, often expressed in the
maxim that 'equality is equity.'"); Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 237, 208 A.2d 129,
134 (1965) ("Contribution . . . stems from the maxim that equality is equity.").
28. Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 218 Minn. 532, 541, 16 N.W.2d 758, 764 (1944)
("[T]he question of liability as between the two tortfeasors is immaterial in determining
the liability of either to the injured person.").
7
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retains the right to sue any co-tortfeasor and may seek execution against
any co-tortfeasor from whom a judgment is obtained. 29 More impor-
tantly, the injured party's rights are not affected by the inability of a
co-tortfeasor to secure contribution or indemnity.20 Therefore, under
traditional common law principles, if a co-tortfeasor is insolvent or not
subject to the court's jurisdiction, the full loss falls upon the other co-
tortfeasors
2
Authorities disagree as to the theoretical basis of contribution and
indemnity. Some state that the doctrines are based on a theory of im-
plied contract.22 As applied to contribution, this theory poses difficulties
because in most cases neither an express nor an implied contract exists
between the co-tortfeasors.' ' Similarly, indemnity often is granted with-
out a prior relationship having existed between the co-tortfeasors.:"
Thus, granting contribution or indemnity based on an implied contract
is an obvious fiction. A second theory offered to support the doctrines
is that of quasi-contract. 31 The rationale for this theory is that payment
29. See id. at 541, 16 N.W.2d at 763 ("[Tlhe injured person may nevertheless sue the
actors jointly or severally and recover against one or all.").
The tort victim nevertheless is entitled to only one satisfaction of a judgment in his
favor. Winzler & Kelly v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 385, 392, 122 Cal. Rptr. 259,
263 (1975); see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 95 (1942).
30. See Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of Dam-
ages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 73, 108 (1976) ("IThe operation of
the loss allocation mechanisms is of no concern to the plaintiff.").
31. See Moody v. Kirkpatrick, 234 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Tenn. 1964); Cooper v. Green-
berg, 191 Va. 495, 61 S.E.2d 875 (1950).
32. See Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 596, 101 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1957) (right of
contribution an equitable one "applied on the theory that there is an implied contract on
the part of one judgment debtor to contribute to another who has paid more than his share
of the obligation").
In Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 118 N.W.2d 559 (1962), a
workman employed by a contractor to clean a plant was injured. He sued the plant owner
who then sought indemnity from the contractor. The court implied a contract by the
contractor to do the work safely and allowed indemnity. Id. at 850, 118 N.W.2d at 563-
64.
33. Cf. Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104 N.W.2d
843, 846 (1960) (impugning broad generalizations as to the actors' relationship), overruled
in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68,
368 n.1l (1977) (abrogating Rule 4); Merrimac Mining Co. v. Gross, 216 Minn. 244, 249,
12 N.W.2d 506, 509 (1943) (contribution not founded on contract).
34. See Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEx. L. REv. 150,
152 (1947).
35. See Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104 N.W.2d
843, 846 (1960) ("The principles governing contribution and indemnity are similar both
in origin and in character. In modern law these principles comprise the subject that is
treated under the general title of restitution."), overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber
Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating
Rule 4); Kennedy v. Camp, 12 N.J. 390, 398, 102 A.2d 595,600 (1954) ("All who are equally
bound are equally relieved by the payment; and contribution is simply the equalizing of
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by one co-tortfeasor does not relieve other co-tortfeasors of their share
of the burden; the application of either doctrine therefore prevents un-
just enrichment.-" This rationale also is inappropriate because the non-
paying co-tortfeasor may not have been unjustly enriched, or even en-
riched at all. :7
At least two additional theories have been offered to support the
awarding of indemnity. First, some courts have suggested that a breach
of an implied warranty provides the theoretical basis for indemnity. "
This view is inappropriate because in most cases in which indemnity is
granted the indemnitor has not sold any merchandise to the indemnitee.
Second, some courts have suggested that the action arises out of tort."
Such theorizing is erroneous because the tort of the indemnitor against
the indemnitee is distinct from any tort committed by the indemnitor
and indemnitee against the injured party."
Perhaps the most accurate rationale offered for either doctrine is that
both lie within a court's inherent power to ensure justice and equity."
the burden . ). Leflar states that contribution is based on a theory of unjust enrich-
ment:
The theory of unjust enrichment fits the facts of the tortfeasor case as well as it
fits those of any contribution case. One person has discharged a burden which
both in law and conscience was equally the liability of another; if contribution
be not allowed, the net assets of the other will be increased at the expense of
the one.
Leflar, supra note 2, at 138.
36. See Leflar, supra note 2, at 136 (applying the unjust enrichment rationale to contri-
bution actions); id. at 147 (applying the unjust enrichment rationale to indemnity ac-
tions).
37. See Turck, supra note 2, at 16 (no "enrichment" when nonpaying tortfeasor is
immune from suit).
38. See Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.) (before recovery in
fourth-party indemnity action fourth-party plaintiff must show either breach of implied
warranty or negligence), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951); Manning Mfg. Co. v. Hartol
Prods. Corp., 99 F.2d 813, 814 (2d Cir. 1938) (indemnity justified in view of breach of
implied warranty of merchantability).
39. See Lowell v. Boston & L.R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24, 33-34 (1839) (principle of
indemnity long admitted in certain cases of torts); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Washington
& Berkeley Bridge Co., 194 F. 1011, 1015 (N.D. W. Va. 1912) ("[T]he original and
fundamental basis of recovery is not contract, but tort to indemnify for which no promise
express or implied arises .... ").
40. See Hodges, supra note 34, at 153.
41. Leflar states that the precise theory upon which contribution is based is unimpor-
tant as long as equity is done:
Actually, it seems not to make much difference what formal explanation is
accepted, so long as it is understood that the right to contribution is not neces-
sarily based on a voluntary consensual transaction between the parties. The
essential thing is the attempt to be fair as between persons subjected to a
common legal liability.
Leflar, supra note 2, at 137 (footnote omitted). Similarly, after examining the various
rationales for indemnity, Leflar concludes: "[Tlhe obligation to indemnify is not a con-
sensual one; it is based altogether upon the law's notion-influenced by an equitable
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To understand contribution and indemnity more fully, the scope of
these remedies and the specific requirements necessary for their imple-
mentation will be discussed.
A. Contribution
I. Scope of the Contribution Remedy
The scope of the contribution remedy can be analyzed most effec-
tively by examining two questions. First, to whom is the remedy ex-
tended, and second, what is the measure of recovery?
a. Parties Allowed Contribution
In early times no common law right to contribution was recognized.
2
This rule derived from Lord Kenyon's pronouncement, in the eighteenth
century English case Merryweather v. Nixan,4 ' that he had never heard
of an action by one joint tortfeasor against another to recover a portion
of the judgment paid to the injured party." Because Merryweather in-
volved an intentional tort,15 subsequent English and early American
decisions refused contribution when co-tortfeasors acted intentionally
and permitted contribution when co-tortfeasors were negligent.'5 Later
background-of what is fair and proper between the parties." Id. at 146-47; see Sorenson
v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361, 216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974) ("[Ilndemnity is
an equitable doctrine which does not lend itself to hard-and-fast rules and must turn on
the facts of each case.").
42. See Leflar, supra note 2, at 130.
43. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
44. See id.
45. Id. Lord Kenyon's short dissertation of the facts indicates there had been an action
in trover with a resulting joint judgment against the co-tortfeasors who apparently had
acted in concert in committing the tort. After the injured party had levied on Merry-
weather for the entire judgment, Merryweather sought from his co-tortfeasor a
"contribution of a moiety." Id.
As even more dramatic example of the common-law courts' unwillingness to aid co-
tortfeasors to reallocate loss is the famous Highwayman's Case, Everet v. Williams (Ex.
1725), noted in 9 L.Q. Rav. 197 (1893), where one highwayman sued his fellow robber for
an accounting of their plunder. The suit was dismissed and both of the plaintiff's solicitors
were assessed costs and fined fifty pounds for contempt. As for the parties, they were
subsequently executed.
46. Nineteenth century English courts granted to negligent tortfeasors either indemnity
or contribution, whichever was appropriate. For examples of cases allowing indemnity, see
Betts v. Gibbins, 111 Eng. Rep. 22, 29 (K.B. 1834) ("where one party induces another to
do an act . . . not clearly in itself a breach of law," indemnity is proper); Adamson v.
Jarvis, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (C.P. 1827) (auctioneer innocently selling stolen goods may
recover if levied against). Illustrative of early cases allowing contribution are Pearson v.
Skelton, 150 Eng. Rep. 533, 534 (Ex. 1836) (partner recovered contribution because "the
rule that wrong-doers cannot have redress or contribution against each other, is confined
to cases where the person seeking redress must be presumed to have known that he was
doing an unlawful act"); Wooley v. Batte, 172 Eng. Rep. 188 (N.P. 1826) (recovery from
a partner for a partnership liability).
IVol. 5
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American courts extended the rule prohibiting contribution to include
all torts.'7 This resulted in the adoption in the majority of American
jurisdictions of a rule barring any reallocation of loss among co-
tortfeasors.8
Early American cases refusing contribution to a tortfeasor whose actions were inten-
tional include: Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind. 248, 250-51 (1857); Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131,
136-38 (N.Y. 1816) (trespass and carrying away timber); Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. (3 Head)
83 (1859) (joint conversion of slaves); Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 28 (1870) (publication of
a libel); Spalding v. Administrator of Oakes, 42 Vt. 129 (1869) (jointly keeping ram known
to be dangerous). The rule denying contribution to co-tortfeasors who acted intentionally
was stated as follows in Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859):
A guilty trespasser . . . can not be allowed to appeal to the law for an indem-
nity, for he has placed himself without its pale by contemning it, and must ask
in vain for its interposition in his behalf.
Id. at 458-59.
For examples of early American cases allowing contribution to a negligent tortfeasor,
see Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859) (between joint operators of a stage for injury
to passenger); Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203 (1853) (creditors jointly levied on wrong
property); Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870) (party injured on
jointly maintained bridge); Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 22 Va. (1 Rand) 328 (1823) (tobacco
inspectors failed to deliver tobacco).
47. See, e.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905)
(railroad and terminal company failed by proper inspection to discover defective brake);
Denneler v. Aubel Ditching Serv., Inc., 203 Kan. 117, 453 P.2d 88 (1969) (automobile
accident); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 167 Or. 661,120 P.2d 223 (1941) (automobile
accident).
Prosser blames the extension of the rule denying contribution to negligent co-tortfeasors
on the development of modem code pleading which allowed joinder of even negligent co-
tortfeasors:
But once the door was thrown open to joinder in one action of those who had
merely caused the same damage, the origin of the rule and the reason for it were
lost to sight. The great majority of our courts proceeded to apply it generally,
and refused to permit contribution even where independent, although concur-
rent, negligence had contributed to a single result.
W. PROsSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 306 (footnote omitted).
48. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 2, at 130. As late as 1951 the Iowa Supreme Court
stated: "Generally, in the absence of statute there can be no contribution or indemnity
between joint tort-feasors." Rozmajzl v, Northland Greyhound Lines, 242 Iowa 1135, 1142,
49 N.W.2d 501, 506 (1951).
Courts justified the rule prohibiting contribution between co-tortfeasors on a number
of grounds. First, several courts have espoused the argument that because tort law is
punitive and meant to deter wrongful conduct, its effects would be diluted by granting
contribution. See, e.g., Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131, 138 (N.Y. 1816) ("There would be
no safety to property if a large combination of trespassers were entitled to the assistance
of the Courts of justice in the apportionment of damage. The knowledge that each individ-
ual is responsible for the whole, constitutes the great check.") (footnote omitted); Rhea
v. White, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 120, 122 (1859) ("The reason of this is, that they may be
intimidated from committing the wrong, by the danger of each being made responsible
for all the consequences.") (footnote omitted); Bohlen, supra note 2, at 557-59; Leflar,
supra note 2, at 133-34.
This argument is not very persuasive because, with the advent of various "no-fault"
compensation systems, tort law has shifted its focus from punishing the wrongdoer to
19791
11
et al.: Contribution and Indemnity—An Examination of the Upheaval in Minn
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Today, however, a majority of American jurisdictions have recognized
compensating the victim. See Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation
and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967):
Today one can muster substantial evidence of society's desire to shift the
focus from the defendant and his conduct to the victim and his plight. This is
revealed, for example, in the way the legal system today handles personal injury
cases, especially those cases in which the courts have altered the very basis of
liability from fault to strict liability. Whether the expansion in the defective
product area is viewed as an extension of warranty law or as a development of
tort law, the crucial point is that many victims who previously had to prove fatlt
in this important area are now able to recover without such a showing.
Id. at 785 (footnote omitted). See generally Palmer, Social Engineering in New Zealand
and the United States: A Comparison of Approaches to Tort Reform, 4 WM. MITCHEL. L.
REv. 315 (1978); Steenson, No-Fault in a Fault Context: Tort Actions and Section 513.51
of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 109 (1976);
Note, Subrogation and Indemnity Rights Under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Act, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 119, 120-21 (1978) ("The no-fault system promises
prompt payment to every injured party in an automobile accident for out-of-pocket losses,
without regard to which party was at fault."). Moreover, refusing to allow a right of
contribution will not deter persons from engaging in negligent torts. This is so because
few negligent co-tortfeasors realize that there is a contribution remedy. Thus, the rule
denying contribution between co-tortfeasors does not affect societal conduct. The District
Court in the District of Columbia, recognizing this argument, stated:
To believe that the rule of no contribution will tend to make a careless person
careful, or that a motorist who is not deterred from carelessness by fear of
personal danger will be affected in his conduct by a legal rule of no contribution
between joint wrongdoers, seems to us wholly fanciful.
Georges Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (footnote
omitted).
Moreover, if the rule prohibiting contribution between co-tortfeasors has as its goal
deterrence and punishment, it seems totally contradictory to allow some intentional co-
tortfeasors to avoid bearing any responsibility for the injured party's loss. See Judson v.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 89, 110 A.2d 24, 34 (1954) ("11f each intentional
wrongdoer knew that his conduct was exposing him to the risk of the certainty of liability
in some amount, the desired deterrent effect would be produced more surely than if
contribution among the wrongdoers is denied."). See generally Leflar, supra note 2, at 133-
34.
For a novel approach to the problem of allocating loss between intentional co-
tortfeasors, see Turck, supra note 2, at 3. The author indicates that the Prussian Code of
1794 "forbade contribution among intentional wrongdoers, however, they were not re-
leased by the payment of the damages by one of them, but had to pay their respective
shares to the public poor fund of the community involved." Id. (footnotes omitted).
A second theory proffered in support of the noncontribution rule is that allowing the
remedy favors insured co-tortfeasors at the expense of uninsured co-tortfeasors. This
theory is based on the belief that an injured party is most likely to bring a claim against
an insured co-tortfeasor. Consequently, the insured co-tortfeasor's insurance company will
attempt to allocate the loss to other co-tortfeasors. Prosser finds this rationale partially
acceptable:
The only kind words said by any writer over the last century for the rule denying
contribution have been addressed to the proposition that contribution will be
used chiefly to permit liability insurance companies to shift a part of the loss
which they have been paid to bear to the shoulders of uninsured defendants.
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 307 (footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, it seems that any system of loss allocation that bases its determination
I[Vol. 5
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the inadequacies of a rule barring contribution in all situations and
therefore allow contribution between negligent co-tortfeasors. 9 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has always permitted contribution between
to allocate loss solely on the basis of insurance and not on culpability is subject to criticism
because such a system would encourage people to go uninsured. This would also lead to
fewer persons in the insurance pool, thus creating higher premium rates.
A third rationale offered in support of the noncontribution rule is that it prevents the
injured party from being "the lord of his cause of action." See James, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1160-65 (1941). But see
Gregory, supra note 2 (rebutting James' article). This rationale is not very convincing,
however, because of the opportunities for collusion between the injured party and a co-
tortfeasor and the arbitrariness by which a co-tortfeasor may be singled out for suit. Cf.
Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn. Rys., 110 Ohio 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924) (a judgment
obtained jointly against two railroads was purchased by a company owning 99% of the
stock of one of the co-tortfeasors; because of the rule prohibiting contribution, the com-
pany purchasing the judgment was allowed to enforce the judgment entirely against the
railroad in which it was not a stockholder).
Finally, several commentators have suggested that the rule denying contribution be-
tween co-tortfeasors stems from the "unclean hands" that such persons bring into court.
See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 2, at 559-60; Turck, supra note 2, at 10. This rationale also
is not convincing because the action for contribution often arises after the injured party's
judgment has been satisifed. Thus, any harm initially done should be viewed as repaired.
Viewed in this perspective, a right to contribution results from a compensatory act, an
action by which the co-tortfeasors cannot be said to have soiled their hands.
49. Altogether, 34 American jurisdictions currently allow some degree of contribution.
Eight states and the District of Columbia have established a right to contribution by
judicial decision. See Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Wiener v. United
Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (Nevada law), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951
(1964); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La.
289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Underwriters
v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa.
354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950);
Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). Louisiana, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin now provide for contribution by statute. In addi-
tion to these five states, 28 other states now have statutes providing for contribution
between co-tortfeasors. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-
1001 to -1009 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 6301-6308 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); GA. CODE
ANN. § 105-2012 (Cum. Supp. 1978); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 663-11 to -17 (1968 & Supp.
1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2413 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1972); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. arts. 2100-2105 (West 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1972); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2925a-
.2925d (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. § 548.19 (1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon 1953); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 17.25-.325 (1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (West 1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-12 (1953); N.Y.
Civ. PIRAc. LAW §§ 1401-1403 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IB-7 (1969); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.440 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§
2082-2089 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977); S.D.
COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3101 to -3106 (Supp.
1977); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-27-39 to -43 (1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-34 (1977); W. VA. CoDE § 55-7-13 (1966);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 113.01-.10 (West 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (1977).
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negligent co-tortfeasors.5" In Ankeny v. Moffett,r" the first case to con-
sider whether contribution between negligent co-tortfeasors should be
permitted, Justice Mitchell stated that the rule against contribution
applied only when the person seeking the remedy is "guilty of an inten-
tional wrong or, at least, where he must be presumed to have known that
he was doing an illegal act. '" '52
Subsequent decisions have denied the remedy whenever the tort re-
sulted from the violation of a statute.'- Initially, the Minnesota court
broadly defined intentional acts to include a presumption of intent
whenever a statute was violated." For example, in Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Christenson,5 a truck owner violated a traffic statute by leaving
his truck parked on a street at night with an unlit taillight."' As a
consequence of this act, a passenger in a negligently driven automobile
was injured.5 The court refused to grant the truck owner contribution
from the negligent driver because the truck owner had actual knowledge
of the unlit taillight .58The court concluded that such knowledge on the
part of the truck owner constituted an intentional violation of the stat-
ute,5" even though the truck owner may have been unaware of the stat-
ute that had been violated."' Although Christenson has been criticized,"'
50. See Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN.
L. RFV. 470, 471-72 (1953).
51. 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887). In Ankeny, the plaintiff was injured when the
walls of a building fell on him. The court allowed contribution from one negligent building
owner to the other.
52. Id. at 110, 33 N.W. at 320.
53. See, e.g., Carriers Ins. Exch. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 310 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1962)
(Virginia law) (driver deliberately ignored safety regulation requiring his presence when
unloading gasoline); Nettles v. Alexander, 169 Ark. 380, 275 S.W. 708 (1925) (corporate
officer intentionally failed to file report required by statute).
Many American courts also deny contribution when a co-tortfeasor is guilty of a "moral
wrong." See, e.g., Turner v. Kirkwood, 49 F.2d 590 (10th Cir.) (conversion and fraud;
contribution denied when there is moral guilt or wrongful intent), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
635 (1931); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (contribution not granted
in cases involving intentional wrong, concerted action by co-tortfeasors, or moral turpi-
tude); Rucker v. Allendorph, 102 Kan. 771, 172 P. 524 (1918) (fraud); Western Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 305, 251 N.W. 491, 492 (1933) (contribu-
tion allowed "where wrong is a mere act of negligence involving no moral turpitude"). But
see Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954) (fraud) (contribu-
tion allowed per statute).
54. See Comment, Joint Tortfeasors: Contribution-No Intentional Wrongdoing Infer-
ence from Strict Liability Statute, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1089, 1091-92 (1969) and cases cited
therein.
55. 183 Minn. 182, 236 N.W. 618 (1931).
56. Id. at 183, 236 N.W. at 618.
57. Id. at 183, 187-88, 236 N.W. at 618, 620.
58. Id. at 186-87, 236 N.W. at 620.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
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its doctrine of presumed intentional violation of statute has never been
expressly overruled.
A 1968 Minnesota case, however, can be interpreted as laying to rest
the Christenson doctrine of presumed intentional violation of statute. In
Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co. 61 the court allowed contribution to a violator
of the Civil Damages Act 3 who had sold liquor to an obviously inebri-
ated customer." The court based its decision to grant contribution on
the absence of any evidence that the co-tortfeasors were conscious of any
wrongdoing or statutory violation."5 The Christenson doctrine, therefore,
apparently is limited to situations in which the intentional nature of the
statutory violation is proved by showing a conscious statutory violation.
Thus, under present Minnesota law co-tortfeasors can obtain contribu-
tion when their actions are not intentional and when any statutory
violations have not resulted from a conscious disregard of the law.
b. Measure of Contribution
Although most jurisdictions presently permit an action for contribu-
tion," the amount recoverable may be measured in two different ways.
Early decisions in Minnesota,"7 as elsewhere,"' awarded contribution
among co-tortfeasors based on the maxim "equality is equity." Courts
utilizing this approach divided loss equally among the co-tortfeasors.""
62. 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968).
63. MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (Supp. 1977), which provides in part:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who
is injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person,
or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name,
against any person who, by illegally selling or bartering intoxicating liquors,
caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; ... and all
suits for damages under this section shall be by civil action ....
64. See 281 Minn. at 417, 161 N.W.2d at 657.
65. See id. at 421, 161 N.W. 2d at 660.
66. See note 49 supra.
67. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304,
310, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951) ("equality is equity"); Van Brunt v. Gorden, 53 Minn. 227,
54 N.W. 1118 (1893).
68. See, e.g., Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1958); Russell
v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 353 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51
1l1. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964); Scammon v. City of Saco, 247 A.2d 108 (Me. 1968);
Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
69. For example, if the injured party receives a verdict for $12,000 and there are three
co-tortfeasors, each will be liable for his pro rata share of $4,000.
Although the 1939 UNIFORM CONTmIUrIoN AMONG Torrmzsoas Acr made available the
possibility of computing shares of liability in contribution among co-tortfeasors on the
basis of comparative fault because its drafters felt that "a very strong case" could be made
for such apportionment, see UNIFORM CoNTmUrIoN AMONG ToRTMFsoRs AcT § 2, Com-
missioners' Note (1939 version), the 1955 Revised Act rejects this position in favor of the
pro rata rule. The drafters of the 1955 revision returned to the pro rata rule because "the
exclusion of intentional, wilfull and wanton actors from the right to contribution elimi-
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Allocating loss equally among co-tortfeasors has come to be known as
the pro rata rule."' The pro rata rule, however, is subject to the exception
that parties who are jointly liable for the breach of a single duty will be
viewed as one entity, and thus loss will not be allocated among the co-
tortfeasors but will be charged to them as a unit." Suits falling within
this exception to the pro rata rule generally are based on vicarious
liability, such as a principal liable for the torts of his agent under the
doctrine of respondeat superior," a person liable for the negligence of his
independent contractor,7 3 or an automobile owner obligated by statute
for a driver's wrongful actions.
The principal rationale for the pro rata rule is that apportioning fault
on any other basis places too great a burden on the courts. 5 Such a
rationale, however, is inconsistent with the widespread adoption of com-
parative negligence laws by both courts" and legislatures.77 Thus, most
nates the better arguments for a relative degree of fault rule." UNIFORM CoNrmBuroN
AMONG JOINT ToRTFEASORs ACT § 2, Commissioners' Comment.
The RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 886A (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970) rejects the pro
rata rule and provides for the equitable apportionment among tortfeasors of shares of
common liability. Comment h to this section recognizes that "Inlormally 'equality is
equity,' " but that apportionment based on degrees of fault is more equitable in a juris-
diction that has adopted the rule of comparative negligence in a plaintiff's action. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comment h (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
70. See generally I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 10.2; W. PRosSER, supra note
1, § 50, at 310.
71. See, e.g, Ramirez v. Redevelopment Agency, 4 Cal. App. 3d 397, 84 Cal. Rptr. 356
(1970) (landlord-tenant); Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 198, 78 S.E.2d
612 (1953) (partnership); Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938) (joint
owners of a building); Bundy v. Consolidated Edison Co., 23 A.D.2d 392, 261 N.Y.S.2d
221 (1965) (three defendants responsible for a single condition).
72. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815 (1918) (master-servant); Titus
v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 228 A.2d 65 (1967) (principal-Board of Education); Zeglen v.
Minkiewicz, 12 N.Y.2d 497, 191 N.E.2d 450, 240 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1963) (master-servant).
73. E.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489 (1918); Lawrence v.
Great N. Ry., 98 F. Supp. 746 (D. Minn. 1951); Larson v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 282 Minn.
135, 163 N.W.2d 755 (1968).
74. See Reese v. Henke, 286 Minn. 145, 174 N.W.2d 690 (1970).
75. Bohlen, supra note 2, at 560; see Turck, supra note 2, at 28.
76. Alaska, California, and Florida judicially adopted comparative fault laws in Kaatz
v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975), Li v. Yellow. Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), and Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), respectively.
77. Comparative negligence analysis has been adopted by statute in at least 28jurisdic-
tions: Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Colorado: COLO.
REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1976); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-572h (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1978); Hawaii:
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663.31 (Supp. 1975); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (Cum. Supp.
1978); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a to -258b (1976); Maine: ME. Rav. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 156 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976), as amended by Act of
Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-7, 1978 Minn. Laws 839; Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-
15 (1972); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975); Nevada: NEv. Rav. STAT. § 41.141
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modern courts, including Minnesota, no longer award contribution on a
pro rata basis."' Instead, contribution is awarded by utilizing compara-
tive negligence principles.19
2. Requirements for Obtaining Contribution in Minnesota
Although authorities disagree as to the theoretical basis for contribu-
tion,"" most agree that two requirements must be satisfied before contri-
bution is proper. First, the co-tortfeasors must be under a common
liability to the injured party." Second, the co-tortfeasor claiming contri-
bution must have paid a disproportionate share of the judgment."2 Both
of these requirements are analyzed below.
a. Common Liability Requirement
To be entitled to contribution, a common liability that is enforceable
against each co-tortfeasor must exist." The rationale for requiring a
(1977); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977); New Jersey: N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); New York: N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§§ 1411-1413 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.2 (McKinney
Supp. 1977); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1977);
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977); South Dakota: S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 20-
9-2 (1969); Texas: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978);
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); Vermont: VT: STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.010-.910 (Supp. 1978); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (1966 & West Cum. Supp. 1978); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109
(1977).
78. See, e.g., Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 302, 208 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1973) (per
curiam) ("[Uinder the comparative negligence statute contribution between joint tort-
feasors is no longer on a 50-50 basis but is apportioned in accordance with the degree of
negligence attributable to each.").
79. Id. With the enactment of the new comparative fault act, see Act of Apr. 5, 1978,
ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 839 (to be codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02),
contribution is awarded in accordance with the degree of fault attributable to each co-
tortfeasor. For an analysis of contribution under the new comparative fault statute, see
notes 299-308 infra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text.
81. Note, supra note 50, at 472.
82. Id.
83. See, e:g., Troutman v. Modlin, 353 F.2d 382, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1965) (automobile
guest statute prevented common liability); Dodick v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 326 F. Supp. 1154,
1155 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (workers' compensation statute exempting employee from liability
for injuries to co-employees prevented contribution action against injured party's fellow
employee); Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345, 352 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (con-
tributory negligence barred contribution action by employer under Federal Employer's
Liability Act), rev'd in part on other grounds, 268 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 932 (1960); Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 48329 (Minn., filed Feb. 9, 1979)
(contribution prohibited against party previously found not negligent in the injured
party's first suit); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn.
19791
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common liability is that contribution is a remedy between co-
tortfeasors. If a person is not liable to the injured party, co-iortfeasors
do not exist, and contribution is unavailable."' Accordingly, contribu-
tion is inappropriate when a party has a defense to the injured party's
action.", Family,86 charitable, 7 or governmental immunities" are exam-
ples of defenses that render contribution unavailable.
The common liability requirement has been criticized because a tort-
feasor may be forced, as a result of the requirement, to bear the entire
financial burden of a judgment that in equity should be paid in part by
another."' The rationale supporting this criticism is that contribution
304, 309, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951) (execution of covenent not to sue does not destroy
common liability); Kauth v. Landsverk, 224 Wis. 554, 558-59, 271 N.W. 841, 843 (1937)
(assumption of risk negated liability).
84. See Allied Mut. Cas, Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829, 838-39, 107 N.W.2d 682, 687 (1961)
("The whole matter may be summed up in the statement that before there can be contri-
bution among tortfeasors, there must be tortfeasors."); Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No.
48329, slip op. at 4 (Minn., filed Feb. 9, 1979) ("only a tortfeasor who is liable for a
plaintiff's loss should be required to contribute to the payment for that loss").
85. See cases cited notes 86-88 infra.
86. See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moiling, 239 Minn. 74, 82-83, 57 N.W.2d 847,
852-53 (1953) (interspousal immunity); Tomkovich v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp.,
61 N.J. Super. 270, 277-78, 160 A.2d 507, 510-11 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (marriage
after accident but before suit filed barred contribution claim); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Gretakis,
162 Va. 597, 599-600, 174 S.E. 841, 842 (1934) (parental immunity even though father's
negligence characterized as being gross). But see Weinberg v. Underwood, 101 N.J. Super.
448, 451, 244 A.2d 538, 540 (Essex County Ct. 1968) (parental immunity cannot prevent
an action for contribution against emancipated child); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 388-89, 102 A.2d 587, 594-95 (1954) (marriage after judg-
ment paid to victim did not prevent contribution).
87. See Servison v. YMCA, 230 Iowa 86, 88, 296 N.W. 769, 769 (1941), overruled,
Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 1274, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (1950).
88. See, e.g., Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707,708-09 (D. Hawaii
1947) (United States did not consent to suit).
The law, however, generally is eliminating immunities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRs ch. 45A (Tent. Drafts Nos. 18-19, 1972-1973). The editorial committee takes the
view that all immunities should be abrogated to the extent there is substantial authority
to that effect. See id., Note to Institute, at 59 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
Charitable immunity was rejected long ago by the Minnesota court. See Miller v.
Macalester College, 262 Minn. 418, 429, 115 N.W.2d 666, 673 (1962) (college); Mulliner
v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 395-98, 175 N.W. 699, 700-01 (1920)
(hospital): In the past 15 years the Minnesota Supreme Court has abolished sovereign
immunity, see Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 132, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (1975) (abro-
gating state immunity after August 1, 1976); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,
264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962) (abolishing governmental immunity as to
school districts, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of government), and intra-
family immunity, see Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 371-73, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420
(1969) (abolishing interspousal immunity); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161
N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968) (limiting immunity of parent from suit by unemancipated child);
Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966) (limiting immunity of
unemancipated child from suit by parent).
89. See, e.g., F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 10.2, at 718; Jensvold, supra note
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exists to apportion the financial burden caused the injured party as a
result of co-tortfeasors' actions." The primary consideration, therefore,
should be whether the parties' actions were tortious and whether those
actions resulted in the loss suffered by the injured person.9
Traditionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has required a showing
of common liability between co-tortfeasors before awarding contribu-
tion." On several recent occasions, however, the court has allowed con-
tribution in the absence of common liability between co-tortfeasors. :
Thus, the status of the common liability requirement in Minnesota is
uncertain" and therefore is discussed subsequently in this Note., "
b. Disproportionate Discharge of Liability Requirement
After common liability has been established, the party seeking contri-
bution must prove a discharge of a disproportionate share of the injured
party's judgment." Under the pro rata loss allocation scheme, a party
6, at 745-47; Note, supra note 50, at 472.
90. See Note, supra note 50, at 472.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 48329 (Minn., filed Feb. 9,1979) (contri-
bution prohibited against party previously found not negligent in the injured party's first
suit); Ascheman v. Village of Hancock, - Minn. -,... 254 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1977)
(action to recover for loss of support); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 363, 63
N.W.2d 355, 364 (1954) (personal injury action); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239
Minn. 74, 79, 57 N.W.2d 847, 851 (1953) (same).
93. See, e.g., Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., - Minn .... 257 N.W.2d 679,
688 (1977) (products liability suit); White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 370, 137 N.W.2d
674, 679 (1965) (third-party complaint filed against city for negligent maintenance of
highway), overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn..-.
-, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
94. Much of the uncertainty, however, was clarified by Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No.
48329 (Minn., filed Feb. 9, 1979) in which the court held that co-tortfeasors generally must
share a common liability to the injured party before contribution is appropriate. See id.,
slip op. at 4. Arguably, some uncertainty remains because the Hart court noted that the
common liability requirement may not have to be met if such a requirement would pro-
duce an unjust result. See notes 209-29.1 and accompanying text for a theoretical frame-
work to determine in which situations the court may award contribution in the absence
of a common liability between co-tortfeasors.
95. See notes 209-29.1 infra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 364, 51 N.W.2d 108, 112 (1952) (as
a general rule, "an action for contribution does not mature until one of two or more
obligors or tort-feasors has paid more than his share of the debt or obligation"); Pennsyl-
vania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 386, 102 A.2d 587, 593 (1954)
("[jloint liability is not enough; payment is of the essence of the right of action, not only
under the statute but also at common law in cases where contribution may be had");
Bolkin v. Levy, 17 Misc. 2d 56, 56, 184 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462-63 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (motion for
contribution premature when joint judgment had not yet been paid). Although the party
seeking contribution must have paid more than his share of the joint liability, this prere-
quisite does not prevent a court from awarding declaratory relief or a judgment conditional
upon the satisfaction of the victim's claim. See, e.g., Smith v. Whitmore, 270 F.2d 741,
746 (3d Cir. 1959) (Pennsylvania) (conditional judgment); Thomas v. Malco Refineries,
19791
19
et al.: Contribution and Indemnity—An Examination of the Upheaval in Minn
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
would be required to prove a discharge of more than the pro rata per-
centage of liability before contribution was awarded97 Similarly, where
comparative negligence is the accepted method of loss allocation in
contribution actions, a co-tortfeasor must show a discharge of liability
in excess of the percentage of negligence attributable to that co-
tortfeasor before contribution is available."
The requirement that liability be discharged does not require that full
payment of the judgment be made to the injured party.9 A settlement,
for example, will fulfill the discharge requirement.1°0 Thus, a co-
tortfeasor may enter into a fair and reasonable settlement with the
injured party without endangering a right to contribution.""' Some juris-
Inc., 214 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1954) (New Mexico) (execution stayed in indemnity case
until plaintiff is paid); Mijon v. Acquaire, 51 N.J. Super. 426, 144 A.2d 161 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1958).
The court in Mijon stated that:
the most relief he can then receive is an order ... that the sued party is a joint
tortfeasor and that, if the suing party later pays more than his pro rata share of
the judgment ... a judgment shall then be entered in his favor ... or...
judgment conditional upon his payment ....
Id. at 440, 144 A.2d at 168 (emphasis in original). Any other result would prevent the
disposal of the entire case in a single proceeding.
97. See cases cited note 96 supra.
98. See Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 302, 208 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1973).
99. See, e.g., Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 275 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D. Minn. 1967)
(motion by third-party defendants to dismiss action for lack of jurisdiction); Radmacher
v. Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72, 74, 117 N.W.2d 738, 740 (1962) (action for personal injuries
and property damage); Coble v. Lacey, 257 Minn. 352, 356, 101 N.W.2d 594, 597 (1960)
(action for personal injuries); Hoverson v. Hoverson, 216 Minn. 228, 236, 12 N.W.2d 501,
506 (1943) (action for partition or sale); Township of Canosia v. Township of Grand Lake,
80 Minn. 357, 359, 83 N.W. 346, 347 (1900) (more than share paid).
100. See, e.g., Merrimac Mining Co. v. Gross, 216 Minn. 244, 251-53, 12 N.W.2d 506,
510-11 (1943) (payment must be "compulsory" in sense that party paying is under legal
obligation to pay); Manthey v. Schueler, 126 Minn. 87, 89, 147 N.W. 824, 825 (1914) (no
recovery for services voluntarily rendered); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen.
Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 306, 251 N.W. 491, 492 (1933) (fulfillment of a legal obligation
does not make one a volunteer).
101. See Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d 421 (1959),
where the court stated:
No sound reason compelled plaintiff to refuse to pay the claims until suit was
brought and they were reduced to judgment. . . . [Ilt was entitled to pay them
when . . . its investigation satisfied it the offers of settlement were fair, reasona-
ble and just. And such payment was no less involuntary than payment of a
judgment upon the claims. The law favors settlement of controversies without
resort to litigation.
Id. at 35, 99 N.W.2d at 427; see Hodges v. United States Fed. & Guar. Co., 91 A.2d 473,
475 (D.C. 1952) (notice of settlement negotiations not required); Employers Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 309, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951) (settlement
does not extinguish right to contribution); Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 225-26, 169
A.2d 289, 291 (1961) (settling party not prejudiced by the fact judgment has not been
entered in favor of injured party); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr.
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dictions, however, limit contribution to co-tortfeasors against whom a
judgment has been rendered."" This requirement springs from the fear
of potential unfairness to co-tortfeasors who are not parties to a settle-
ment." : However, co-tortfeasors who are not parties to settlement agree-
ments are protected against unfair settlements by requiring the co-
tortfeasor who obtains the settlement to establish the fairness and rea-
sonableness of the settlement."" Only then will the nonsettling co-
tortfeasor be subject to the settlement.'15
A co-tortfeasor who obtains a settlement is not, by virtue of the settle-
ment, insulated from a contribution claim by another co-tortfeasor. "' A
Co., 213 Wis. 302, 306, 251 N.W. 491, 492 (1933) (fulfillment of a legal obligation does not
make one a volunteer).
102. See, e.g., Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(wrongful death); Buckner v. Foster, 105 F. Supp. 279, 281 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (personal
injury), aff'd, 203 F.2d 527 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953); Kahn v. Urania
Lumber Co., 103 So. 2d 476, 481 (La. Ct. App. 1958) (tort action by parents of fatally
injured son).
Some states, on the other hand, take a middle road and require only that a judgment
have been entered against the party seeking contribution. See, e.g., Traveler's Ins. Co. v.
United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 25 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (satisfied by consent judgment);
Brown & Root, Inc: v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 264 (S.D. Tex. 1950) (voluntary
settlement agreement before trial), aff'd, 198 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1952); Young v. Steinberg,
53 N.J. 252, 255-56, 250 A.2d 13, 14 (1969) (consent judgment allowed).
103. See Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L.
REV. 365, 379-93.
104. See, e.g., Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 35, 99 N.W.2d
421, 427 (1959) (action by liability insurer of owner of truck against construction company
which dropped clay on road where accident occurred); Young v. Steinberg, 53 N.J. 252,
255-56, 250 A.2d 13, 14 (1969) (automobile negligence action); Swartz v. Sunderland, 403
Pa. 222, 225-26, 169 A.2d 289, 291 (1961) (nonsettling party must overcome presumption
of reasonableness of settlement); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527,
531, 118 S.E.2d 646, 648-49 (1961) (burden on contribution defendant to show bad faith
or unreasonable settlement).
The Pennsylvania court in Swartz emphasized that allowing contribution after settle-
ment will not deprive a co-tortfeasor of his rights: "Nor will the appellee ... be preju-
diced by the fact that judgment has not first been entered in favor of the injured party.
They ico-tortfeasorsl will still have their day in court with full opportunity to defend
against liability and the reasonableness of the amount paid in settlement of the existing
claim." 403 Pa. at 225-26, 169 A.2d at 291 (emphasis in original).
If there is evidence of bad faith, all contribution may be denied. In Trampe v. Wisconsin
Tel. Co., 214 Wis. 210, 216-17, 252 N.W. 675, 677-78 (1934), the plaintiffs and one tort-
feasor entered into a secret agreement designed to cause the other tortfeasor to bear an
excessive share of the loss and to give the plaintiff an excessive recovery. Both contribution
in favor of the conspiring co-tortfeasor and additional recovery for the injured party were
denied.
105. See Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d 421 (1959).
106. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 287 Minn. 264, 268, 178 N.W.2d
620, 624 (1970); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954). It
should be noted that in Gronquist, the court held that contribution was barred only
because the tort committed was intentional. See id. at 129, 64 N.W.2d at 166. The rule
that a co-tortfeasor committing an intentional tort is not entitled to contribution was
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release' '7 or covenant not to sue'0 8 only precludes further action by the
established early in Minnesota law. See Warren v. Westrup, 44 Minn. 237, 239, 46 N.W.
347, 348 (1890). See generally Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the
Pierringer Release in Minnesota, 3 WM. MrrCHmEL L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1977).
107. Traditionally, a release of one co-tortfeasor operated as a release of all co-
tortfeasors. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 72 F. Supp. 185, 187 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (release of one tortfeasor releases all tortfeasors), rev'd on other grounds, 167 F.2d
841 (3d Cir. 1948); Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701, 703-05, 268 P. 943, 944 (1928)
($380.27 payment by one party released $1,245 claim); Holmgren v. Heisick, 287 Minn.
386, 391, 178 N.W.2d 854, 858 (1970) (settlement effected discharge of all claims); Joyce
v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co., 173 Minn. 310, 312, 217 N.W. 337, 338 (1928) (settle-
ment effected discharge of any claims); Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Minn. 284, 285-86, 83
N.W. 1091, 1092 (1900) (same). This is true regardless of the intentions of the parties. See,
e.g., Bryan v. Creaves, 138 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944)
(attempted reservation of a cause of action against another tortfeasor was of no effect);
Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 42-43, 298 P.2d 957, 959 (1956) (provision in release stating
it would release the "undersigned defendants only" was ineffective); Shortt v. Hudson
Supply & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 306, 312-13, 60 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1950) (covenant not to sue
one tortfeasor released others). For a discussion of the development of the "release of one,
releases all" doctrine, see Simonett, supra note 106, at 12-13 n.50. The "release of one,
releases all" doctrine, however, has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Note, Release of a
Joint Tortfeasor, 28 IOWA L. REv. 515 (1943); Note, Joint Tort-Feasors-Release of One
Joint Tort-Feasor as a Bar to Right of Action Against Others, 22 MiNN. L. REv. 692 (1938);
Comment, Torts--Joint and Several Liability-Releases, Covenants not to Sue, Cove-
nants not to Levy & Execute-Reduction of Judgment Debts Pro Tanto, 24 S. CAL. L. REv.
466 (1951); 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414 (1959). One writer has noted:
The application of the rule that a release of one releases all has not been alto-
gether happy. Judges and lawyers seized upon the dogmatic statement of the
rule and applied it to destroy many meritorious claims where plaintiffs sought
or could get only partial satisfaction from one of the tort obligors. . . .Thus, a
rule, which had developed out of a fiction of procedure to obtain the salutory
result of preventing a plaintiff from obtaining more than that to which he was
entitled, was turned into a vicious truism and defeated the very object on which
it was founded: the full redress of plaintiff's injuries.
Comment supra, at 471 (footnotes omitted). Such criticism has persuaded the Minnesota
court that the archaic common law release rule will only operate against the injured party
when the release instrument demonstrates an actual intention of the parties to release all
co-tortfeasors. See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954);
Simonett, supra note 106, at 13.
108. A covenant not to sue is an agreement entered into by the injured party and a
settling co-tortfeasor, in which the injured party agrees not to commence or continue to
prosecute any action based upon the claim in dispute in return for a specified sum of
money. See, e.g., Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 121, 64 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (1954);
Joyce v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co., 173 Minn. 310, 311-12, 217 N.W. 337, 338 (1928);
Musolf v. Duluth Edison Elec. Co., 108 Minn. 369, 377, 122 N.W. 499, 502 (1909). A
covenant need not reserve the right to sue other co-tortfeasors for that right to remain
effective. But the reservation of such a right is important in determining whether the
parties intended the right to exist or whether they intended to settle the claim entirely
and release the other co-tortfeasors from the action. See Joyce v. Massachusetts Real
Estate Co., 173 Minn. 310, 313-14, 217 N.W. 337, 338-39 (1928). But see Musolf v. Duluth
Edison Elec. Co., 108 Minn. 369, 375-76, 122 N.W. 499, 502 (1909) ("reservation of the
right to sue other joint tortfeasors is obviously necessary to a covenant not to sue"). For a
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injured party;' 09 the "released" co-tortfeasors remain subject to a contri-
bution suit by other co-tortfeasors. ' 0 The amount paid to the injured
party by the settling co-tortfeasor is considered a proportionate dis-
charge of liability to the injured party, however, and therefore is treated
as a credit against any contribution claim asserted by a nonsettling co-
tortfeasor.'
Additionally, Minnesota courts allow contribution claims to be liti-
gated by cross-claims,"12 or third-party proceedings.13 These liberal join-
der rules facilitate the litigation of the injured party's claim with the
contribution claim and thereby render the disproportionate discharge
discussion of the distinction between a covenant and a release, see Simonett, supra note
106, at 12-18.
109. See Simonett, supra note 106, at 15.
110. See id.
111. See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 127-28, 64 N.W.2d 159, 165 (1954); Simo-
nett, supra note 106, at 15. This approach allows the injured party full recovery from the
other co-tortfeasors and also recognizes fully the duty to contribute. It does so, however,
at the expense of depriving the settlement of its necessary finality. Consequently, this
approach does not create an atmosphere conducive to settlement. While the injured party
has much to gain by such a settlement, the co-tortfeasor is given little incentive to settle
because one of the prime motives for settling-avoidance of future costly legal battles-is
lacking. The UNIFORM CoNrauTION AMONG ToR1'rnAsos AcT attempted to solve this
problem by adopting the provision that the release discharges the one to whom it is given
from all liability for contribution. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG Torr. mons AcT §
4(b). Minnesota, however, has not adopted the Uniform Act or any other statutory protec-
tion for a settling co-tortfeasor.
An alternative to the enactment of the UNIFORM Co mIBUrIoN AMONG ToRTrn.SoRs AcT
is the use of a device known as a Pierringer release. This device (1) releases the settling
co-tortfeasor from the lawsuit and discharges a part of the cause of action equal to that
part attributable to the settling co-tortfeasor's causal negligence, (2) reserves the balance
of the whole cause of action against the nonsettling co-tortfeasors, and (3) contains an
agreement whereby the plaintiff indemnifies the settling co-tortfeasors from any claims
of contribution made by the nonsettling co-tortfeasors to the extent the settling co-
tortfeasor has been released. For an in-depth analysis of the use of the Pierringer release
in Minnesota, see Simonett, supra note 106. The use of the Pierringer release in Minne-
sota was expressly approved in Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Minn. 1978).
112. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 13.07. Cross-claims are claims against a co-party and should
not be confused with counterclaims which are claims against an opposing party. Cross-
claims may be pleaded if the claim is related to the transaction or occurrence of either
the original claim or any counterclaim. Cross-claims in Minnesota are not compulsory.
See Coble v. Lacey, 257 Minn. 352, 358-60, 101 N.W.2d 594, 599 (1960). However, the rule
of Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 519-20, 131 N.W.2d 741,744 (1964), providing for one-
way res judicata, requires the pleader to assert a cross-claim or run the risk of later having
his claim barred.
113. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 14.01. The third-party complaint must allege that the third-
party defendant is liable, in whole or in part, to the third-party plaintiff for the third-
party plaintiff's liability to the original plaintiff. Thus, the third-party action may not be
attempted by the defendant to offer the plaintiff a co-tortfeasor whom the defendant
believes to be solely responsible to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Altendorfer v. Jandric, Inc., 294
Minn. 475, 478, 199 N.W.2d 812, 814-15 (1972) (action for property damage).
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requirement easily attainable." ' Thus, because of Minnesota's liberal
procedural rules the disproportionate discharge of liability requirement
rarely will present difficulties to the co-tortfeasor seeking contribution.
B. Indemnity
1. Scope of the Indemnity Remedy
The scope of the indemnity remedy can be analyzed most effectively
by examining to whom the remedy is extended. The measure of recovery
is not a consideration because the full amount of the judgment is re-
coverable."'
Just as Merryweather v. Nixan 6 was interpreted to limit contribution
between intentional co-tortfeasors, that case also was interpreted to
deny indemnity when co-tortfeasors' actions were intentional."7
Merryweather apparently was not construed, however, to prohibit in-
demnity between negligent co-tortfeasors.1"
A right to indemnity may arise under a number of different situ-
ations." 9 The most frequent examples of indemnity are those that arise
114. See Comment, Another Look at Strict Liability: The Effect on Contribution
Among Tortfeasors, 79 DICK. L. REV. 125, 127-28 (1974).
115. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 371, 104
N.W.2d 843, 847 (1960) ("indemnity requires one party to reimburse the other entirely"),
overruled in part on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn.....
255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
116. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
117. See Note, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged For Negligence-
Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARtv. L. REv. 176, 177, 182 (1899).
118. See id. In the following cases the courts granted indemnity without reference to
the prohibitions placed on the remedy by Merryweather. See Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.
v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 251 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir. 1957) (self-insured em-
ployer brought action against negligent third party to recover amount of death benefits);
Samuelson v. Chicago, .Ii. & P.R.R., 287 Minn. 264, 267, 178 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1970)
(wrongful death action); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503,
509, 122 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1963) (action to recover compensation paid injured employer);
Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 352-54, 63 N.W.2d 355, 358-59 (1954) (action for
personal injuries).
119. Minnesota has three alternative procedural methods by which a co-tortfeasor may
obtain indemnity. First, when the injured party has joined both the indemnitor and the
indemnitee in the same lawsuit a right to indemnity may simply be asserted by bringing
a cross-claim pursuant to MINN. R. Civ. P. 13.07. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc.,
298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974) (distributor upon being held liable for injury to
customer's employee granted indemnity from manufacturer). Second, when the indemni-
tor was not included by the injured party in the original complaint, but could have been,
a right to indemnity may be asserted by the indemnitee bringing a third-party complaint
pursuant to MINN. R. Civ. P. 14.01. See, e.g., Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63
N.W.2d 355 (1954) (automobile owner granted indemnity from garage owner). Under
either of these methods any confusion or difficulty caused by the presentation of the
complaint and cross-claim may be obviated by a separate trial of the indemnity issues by
bringing a motion for severance pursuant to MINN. R. Civ. P. 42.02. Finally, when the
indemnitee has satisfied a judgment or settled a claim with the injured person, the indem-
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from insurance agreements.'1° Indemnity also may be awarded in the
absence of an express contract.' Thus, indemnity may be proper when
liability has been imposed vicariously on the indemnitee, such as the
liability imposed on a principal for the torts of his agent 2 or on an
automobile owner for a driver's negligence. 23 Additionally, some courts
have allowed indemnity when a co-tortfeasor's negligence resulted from
a failure to inspect and correct a danger created by another co-
tortfeasor. '
2
The precise scope of the indemnity remedy is uncertain, however,
because of the confusing tangle of tests and rules used by courts in
awarding indemnity. '2 As several commentators have concluded, listing
the cases in which indemnity has been granted is easier than extrapola-
ting from these cases precise rules for the implementation of indem-
nity. 2 The resulting confusion stems partially from courts having
nitee may bring a separate action for indemnity. See Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy,
183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931). Thus, absent jurisdictional difficulties, an indemni-
tee should have little trouble asserting an indemnity claim in Minnesota. See generally
Comment, supra note 114, at 127-28.
120. See, e.g., Laurie v. Holland America Ins. Co., 31111. App. 2d 437, 445, 176 N.E.2d
678, 682 (1961); Moore v. Capitol Nat'l Bank, 274 Mich. 56, 61, 254 N.W. 288, 289 (1936);
Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Kansas City Title Ins. Co., 217 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949). But see Brotherton Constr. Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 406 Pa. 400,
178 A.2d 696, 697 (1962) (contracts of indemnity are not contracts of insurance). See
generally 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:9 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1959).
121. See, e.g., Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 100-01, 193 N.W.2d 305,
311 (1971) (indemnity obtained against an employer who was not subject to a common
law suit by its employee); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368,
370, 104 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1960) (indemnity may rest on contracts express or implied),
overruled in part on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn.....
255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
122. See Weidert v. Monahan Post Legionnaire Club, Inc., 243 Iowa 643, 651-52, 51
N.W.2d 400, 404 (1952).
123. See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Postol, 142 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349,355, 63 N.W.2d 355,360 (1954); Truab
v. Dinzler, 309 N.Y. 395, 401, 131 N.E.2d 564, 567 (1955).
124. See, e.g., Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601, 605-06 (3d Cir. 1967)
(refrigerator manufacturer allowed indemnity from maker of compressor when compressor
exploded injuring repairman); Allied Mut. Cas. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 279 F.2d
455, 459-60 (10th Cir. 1960) (operator of automobile allowed indemnity for accident caused
by faulty brakes); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Ky. 1967) (retail store
allowed indemnity for liability to customer from soft drink bottler for defective carton);
Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 358, 216 N.W.2d 859, 862 (1974) (distributor
of safety device used in changing truck tires entitled to indemnity from manufacturer).
But see Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 366-68,
368 n.11 (1977) (expressly overruling right to indemnity for failure to discover another's
negligence).
125. See Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. REv.
728, 738 (1968).
126. Id.; see, e.g., Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed
Rationale, 37 IowA L. REv. 517, 539-44 (1952).
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granted indemnity when contribution between co-tortfeasors was pro-
hibited.'" The confusion has been exacerbated because many courts
have awarded indemnity only after placing labels on the co-tortfeasor's
conduct. ' Some of these labels include such intangible terms as "active
and passive,"'' 9 "primary and secondary,"' 3 and "constructive and ac-
tual negligence.' 3' These labels have been criticized as artificial and
devoid of the objective criteria desirable for achieving predictability in
127. See, e.g., Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 350-52, 215 N.W.2d 810, 813-14
(1974) (bus driver found 76% negligent granted indemnity against two passengers each
12% negligent; contribution not appropriate because bus driver's negligence was
"passive"), overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -,
- 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4); Keefer v. Al Johnson
Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 101, 193 N.W.2d 305, 311 (1971) (general contractor found 28%
negligent held entitled to indemnity from employer subcontractor found 55% negligent;
contribution not appropriate because no common liability between employer and third-
party plaintiff). See generally Bohlen, supra note 2, at 568; Polelle, supra note 2, at 279;
Comment, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 123, 126 (1965).
128. See Comment, supra note 125, at 738.
129. Commentators and courts have understandably disagreed as to what, precisely, an
"active-passive" negligence test can and is designed to measure. Compare Comment,
supra note 125, at 738 (causal connection) with Note, The Right to Indemnity in Products
Liability Cases, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 614, 619 (culpability). The Minnesota court apparently
views quality of negligence as the key criteria. See Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346,
350, 215 N.W.2d 810, 814 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., __ Minn. - , -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
130. This formulation attempts to distinguish between parties on the basis of the differ-
ent "duties" owed to the victim. See Comment, supra note 125, at 738-39. The Minnesota
court, however, uses the terms interchangeably with the active-passive dichotomy. Tol-
bert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 n.7 (1977).
131. Lowell v. Boston & L.R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24, 32 (1839).
Other labels are used by courts in awarding indemnity. See, e.g., Robbins v. Chicago
City, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 657, 679 (1866) (injury resulting "directly"); Shannon v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins.'Co., 62 F. Supp. 532, 540 (W.D. La. 1945) ("the wrongdoer in
the physically participative sense and the wrongdoer in the legally relative sense") (em-
phasis in original); Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 552, 199 N.W. 988, 990
(1924) ("primary and active wrongdoer"); Lowell v. Boston & L.R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.)
24, 34 (1839) ("first and principal wrong-doer"); Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N.C.
18, 28, 70 S.E. 1070, 1074 (1911) ("principal and moving cause"); Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. Dingle-Clark Co., 142 Ohio St. 346, 353, 52 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1943)
("concurrent or joint tort-feasors, as distinguished from related tort-feasors").
One noted commentator has concluded that the word games courts play when awarding
indemnity is very similar to the "Humpty Dumpty Rule." See Davis, supra note 126, at
541 n.147. The "Humpty Dumpty Rule" stems from the following conversation:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different
things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLAss 112 (Heritage Press ed. 1941) (cited in Davis,
supra) (emphasis in original).
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the law. 32 Because of the confusion generated by these labels the practi-
tioner faces uncertainty as to which doctrine will operate, and the legal
scholar confronts confusing rationales as to why a court has decided to
shift a particular loss to a particular party. An analysis of the require-
ments for obtaining indemnity in Minnesota may help to clarify this
uncertainty.
2. Requirements for Obtaining Indemnity in Minnesota
Seeking to clarify the guidelines for implementing indemnity, the
Minnesota Supreme Court established five rules for the application of
indemnity in Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co. "I Satisfying
one of the Hendrickson rules may be the sole requirement a co-tortfeasor
must meet to successfully bring an indemnity action.' The Minnesota
court, however, previously, has required proof that the indemnitee's con-
duct did not constitute independent and concurrent negligence, and
that if the indemnitee was negligent this negligence was not character-
ized as "active.'1 3 These additional requirements have not been a stan-
dard prerequisite for indemnity but recur with sufficient frequency to
warrant examination. Accordingly, each Hendrickson rule, as well as the
independent and concurrent negligence and the active-passive negli-
gence tests, must be analyzed separately to understand the scope of
Minnesota indemnity law.
a. The Hendrickson Rules
In Hendrickson the court held that before a co-tortfeasor may be
granted indemnity his conduct must fall within one of the following five
rules:
Rule 1.
A co-tortfeasor may be granted indemnity when the one seeking in-
demnity has only derivative or vicarious liability for damage caused by
the one sought to be charged.'37
132. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Lan Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 886, 73 Cal. Rptr.
660, 664 (1968); see Davis, supra note 126, at 539-44.
133. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
In Hendrickson the plaintiff's husband was electrocuted while moving a house in the
course of his employment. The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the
defendant power company. The defendant impleaded the employer on the theory that a
contract existed between it and the employer to indemnify it for any damages resulting
from the contract's breach. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order
dismissing the third-party action.
134. See Jensvold, supra note 6, at 723 n.3 (indemnity "possible" when a Hendrickson
rule satisfied),
135. See notes 185-87 infra and accompanying text.
136. See notes 190-202 infra and accompanying text.
137. 258 Minn. at 372, 104 N.W.2d at 848.
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Rule 1 applies to situations in which a co-tortfeasor's liability is vicar-
ious or derivative.'1' This type of liability is imposed by law as a result
of the actions of another.'3 9 A common situation falling within this cate-
gory is the liability imposed on a motor vehicle owner for the negligent
acts of another."10 For example, when an automobile is entrusted by the
owner to a garage for repairs and a mechanic has an accident while road
testing the vehicle, the owner may be held statutorily liable to the
injured party.'' Because the imposition of liability in such cases does
not depend on the automobile owner's fault, Rule 1 shifts the burden
of loss from the innocent co-tortfeasor to the co-tortfeasor whose culp-
able conduct caused the injured party's loss.'42 The rationale for allow-
ing indemnity in Rule 1 cases is that the party causing an injury should
be solely responsible for the injured party's loss."'
Most likely Rule 1 was formulated to minimize the sometimes harsh
results created by the vicarious liability doctrine."' Implicit in Rule 1
is the public policy recognition that a co-tortfeasor held absolutely liable
for the wrongful actions of another has been injured just as much by the
other co-tortfeasor's wrongful actions as the injured party."' To obtain
indemnity under Rule 1 the indemnitee must be free of all fault.", If the
indemnitee is even partially at fault, only contribution is proper. '
Rule 2.
A co-tortfeasor may be granted indemnity when the one seeking in-
demnity has incurred liability by action at the direction of, in the
interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be charged.""
Rule 2 permits indemnity when the indemnitee has been held liable
for actions performed at the indemnitor's direction. A common Rule 2
138. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 366
(1977).
139. See generally Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk 1, 38 YALE
L.J. 584 (1929); James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TuLANE L. REV. 161 (1954); Laski, The Basis
of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
140. See Reese v. Henke, 286 Minn. 145, 149-50, 174 N.W.2d 690, 693 (1970) (owner and
driver treated as one for contribution purposes in measuring pro rata share).
141. See Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
142. See id. at 354, 63 N.W.2d at 359-60.
143. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. ____ , 255 N.W.2d 362, 366
(1977).
144. See Leflar, supra note 2, at 148-50.
145. Cf. Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 355, 63 N.W.2d 355, 360 (1954) ("Now
that such liability is imposed upon the bailor by our Financial Responsibility Act, we
should accept the fact that the liability so imposed is as much a damage to her resulting
from the bailee's negligent conduct as damage to the bailor's property would be.").
146. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 366-67
(1977).
147. See id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 366-68.
148. 258 Minn. at 373, 104 N.W.2d at 848.
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situation occurs when an agent seeks indemnity from a principal.", For
example, a sheriff held liable for foreclosing the wrong mortgage has
been granted indemnity from the attorney who selected the property to
be foreclosed.'5 Indemnity is appropriate because liability should be
imposed upon a principal for damages caused by an agent's good faith
execution of tasks that are not manifestly wrong.'' The agent is acting
on matters known by the principal alone, and, therefore, the agent is not
at fault for the injuries caused by the agent's actions. 5 ' Moreover, an
agent is entitled, in the absence of a very good reason to the contrary,
to assume that the principal's authority was properly delegated. 53 Ap-
parently, Rule 2 is based on the public policy that unless such an as-
sumption could be made persons would be hesitant to become agents,
thereby causing commerce to suffer.' Rule 2 also requires an indemni-
tee to be free from personal fault;' if not, contribution is the appropri-
ate action. 58
Rule 3.
A co-tortfeasor may be granted indemnity when the one seeking in-
demnity has incurred liability because of a breach of duty owed to him
by the one sought to be charged. 7
Rule 3 applies when an indemnitee is liable to an injured party be-
cause the indemnitor breached a duty owed to the indemnitee. Exactly
what is meant by the term "breach of a duty owed" is uncertain, al-
though an analysis of the cases cited by the Hendrickson court in sup-
port of Rule 3 indicates that the term refers to nondelegable duties owed
to an indemnitee by an indemnitor15 8 For example, a bridge owner held
149. See, e.g., Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 82, 87 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 508 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975); Castille v. Folck, 338 So. 2d 328, 333 (La.
1976); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., - Minn. -, -, 252 N.W.2d 107, 120 (1977);
Henderson v. Eckern, 115 Minn. 410, 132 N.W. 715 (1911) (cited by Hendrickson court as
a Rule 2 case); Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Super. 580, 585-87, 166 A.2d 784, 787 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1960); Geltzer v. Russell, 49 A.D.2d 823, 823-24, 373 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568
(1975); Modine Mfg. Co. v. North E. Independent School Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 845 (Tex.
1973).
150. See Henderson v. Eckern, 115 Minn. 410, 412-13, 132 N.W. 715, 716 (1911).
151. See, id. at 413, 132 N.W. at 716; Leflar, supra note 2, at 151-52.
152. See Henderson v. Eckem, 115 Minn. 410, 412-13, 132 N.W. 715, 716 (1911).
153. See Howe v. Buffalo, N.Y. & E.R.R., 37 N.Y. 297, 298-99 (1867).
154. Cf. Leflar, supra note 2, at 148-51 (principals are usually in better position to
distribute loss to consumers).
155. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 366-67
(1977).
156. See id.
157. 258 Minn. at 373, 104 N.W.2d at 848.
158. In formulating Rule 3, the Hendrickson court cited Kahler v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 204 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1953) (co-tortfeasor who conducts marksmanship show has
nondelegable duty to keep gun zone free of spectators), Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495,
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liabile for injuries resulting from improper bridge maintenance may seek
indemnity from the party that promised to repair the bridge. 9 More-
over, a lessor is entitled to indemnity from a lessee when a person suffers
injury on property that contains a hidden defective condition, which
arose during the term of the lease.1 " In these situations, and others cited
by the Hendrickson court, the common thread running through the
cases is that the indemnitor has assumed and then breached a duty that
the law, as a matter of public policy, views as nondelegable.'51
Unfortunately, Rule 3 does not give guidelines for determining which
duties are nondelegable. Adding to this uncertainty are Justice Kelly's
recent comments, voiced in a concurring opinion in Frey v. Montgomery
Ward & Co. "I In that case Justice Kelly characterized Rule 3 as contem-
plating a duty owed not to breach an implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity.1 Because none of the previous Rule 3 cases involved a breach of
warranty and because Justice Kelly's comments were enunciated in a
concurring opinion, the ambit of Hendrickson's third rule is uncertain. 5
Rule 4.
A co-tortfeasor may be granted indemnity when the one seeking in-
demnity has incurred liability merely because of the failure, even
though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of the one
sought to be charged.'
Rule 4 allowed an indemnitee to shift the loss arising from a failure
to discover an indemnitor's negligence.' For example, a bus driver
83 N.W.2d 252 (1957) (when the negligence of both co-tortfeasors was the proximate cause
of the accident, only contribution is possible), Dehn v. S. Brand Coal & Oil Co., 241 Minn.
237, 63 N.W.2d 6 (1954) (breach of duty to return premises in as good a condition as when
received entitles lessor to indemnity when a child is subsequently injured on property),
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140 Minn. 229, 167 N.W. 800 (1918)
(breach of duty to fasten wire on pole securely is a proper situation for indemnity),
overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255
N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977), and Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121,
16 N.W. 698 (1883) (breach of duty to exercise reasonable diligence in repairing a bridge
requires the party responsible for bridge maintenance to indemnify the bridge owner). See
Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 373, 104 N.W.2d 843, 848
(1960), overruled in part on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -,
- 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
159. See Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698 (1883).
160. See Dehn v. S. Brand Coal & Oil Co., 241 Minn. 237, 63 N.W.2d 6 (1954).
161. See cases cited note 158 supra.
162. 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977).
163. See id. at 789 (Kelly, J., concurring specially).
164. For an examination of the future validity of Hendrickson's third rule, see notes 282-
96 infra and accompanying text.
165. 258 Minn. at 373, 104 N.W.2d at 848.
166. See Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 350, 215 N.W.2d 810, 813 (1974),
[Vol, 5
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found liable to an injured party for failing to prevent the horseplay of
two passengers that resulted in a third passenger suffering injury was
entitled to indemnity from the negligent passengers."67 Rule 4 also ap-
plied to product liability cases in which a defective product passed
undetected through a sales chain of distribution to an injured party.'1
The justification for Rule 4 was that the indemnitee's fault was due
only to "passive" or "secondary" negligence.6 9 Recognizing the inade-
quacies of this rationale, the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically ab-
rogated this rule in Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc.,' 0 in which the
court reasoned that a party whose fault caused the injured party's loss
should share the cost of making the injured party whole. "' Under
Tolbert, loss in Rule 4 cases is allocated among all co-tortfeasors accord-
ing to their relative fault.' Thus, when all co-tortfeasors are responsible
overruled, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68,
368 n.ll (1977).
167. See Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 350, 215 N.W.2d 810, 813 (1974),
overruled, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn . . 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68,
368 n.l (1977).
168. See Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361, 216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974),
overruled, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68,
368 n.l (1977).
169. See Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 358, 216 N.W.2d 859, 862 (1974)
(secondarily liable distributor entitled to indemnity from manufacturer), overruled, Tol-
bert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11
(1977); Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 351, 215 N.W.2d 810, 813 (1974) (bus driver
only secondarily liable for acts of student passengers), overruled, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
Inc., - Minn. - , - , 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll (1977).
170. - Minn. -, 255 N.W.2d 362 (1977).
171. See id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 367-68.
172. See id. The question of what factors indicate "fault" is a difficult one. Indeed,
Justice Rogosheske dissented in Tolbert because he did not think allocation of loss could
be based on relative fault concepts:
The majority opinion, I assume, applies only where liability of the manufacturer
and the retailer or installer is based on negligence, since the jury's findings as
to strict liability and breach of warranty are utterly ignored. If my assumption
is incorrect and apportionment of fault is to be extended to defective product
cases where liability is based on breach of warranty or strict liability, apportion-
ment of fault would require a wholly different comparison of the fault-producing
relationship between the parties. Factors such as size and technical expertise
surely would be important considerations in assessing relative culpability be-
tween, for example, a large manufacturer and a small neighborhood variety store
or one-man installer. I doubt that an intelligible rule or jury instruction could
be fashioned which would permit a jury to apply equitable principles necessarily
required to justly apportion liability.
Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 372 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
Apparently the only commentator who has attempted to fashion a rule for determining
which factors make up "fault" is Jensvold. See Jensvold, supra note 6, at 741-45. Jensvold
advocates that in making its determination of what constitutes relative fault the jury
should be instructed to weigh the following factors:
(a) the extent to which conduct of a defendant induced the plaintiff to purchase
19791
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for causing an injured party's loss, contribution, rather than indemnity,
is the appropriate method for allocating loss.
17 3
Rule 5.
A co-tortfeasor may be granted indemnity when there is an express
contract between the parties containing an explicit undertaking to
reimburse for liability of the character involved."'
Rule 5 permits contractual indemnity. Contracts that indemnify a
party against liability resulting from that party's own negligent acts are
valid unless the agreement violates public policy. "5 For example, a con-
tract indemnifying a retailer for liability resulting from selling glue to
minors is void when the sale violates a state statute.' In general, how-
ever, many indemnity contracts will be upheld.'" Guidelines for deter-
mining which indemnity contracts will be upheld are offered by Profes-
sor Williston'" and the Restatement of Contracts.7' Both authorities
the product which caused his injury; (b) the extent to which the conduct of the
defendant was motivated by a justifiable reliance upon the proper conduct of
others; (c) the economic gain derived by each defendant as a result of his con-
duct in comparison to such gains derived by other defendants; and (d) the
likelihood of the accident not happening at all in the absence of defendant's
conduct.
Id. at 742.
173. See - Minn. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 367-68.
174. 258 Minn. at 373, 104 N.W.2d at 848.
175. See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co, of N. America v. Koontz-Wagner Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
380, 383 (7th Cir. 1956) (agreement indemnifying contractor for liability arising from work
under contract is valid); Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 144, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1973)
(agreement indemnifying retailer held invalid as against public policy because of statute
prohibiting sale of glue to minors); Speltz Grain & Coal Co. v. Rush, 236 Minn. 1, 7-8, 51
N.W.2d 641, 644-45 (1952) (railroad company's insertion of clause in lease which placed
all burden of loss on lessee of land is valid); Pettit Grain & Potatoe Co. v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 227 Minn. 225, 235, 35 N.W.2d 127, 133 (1948) (lease provision indemnifying railroad
against loss from fire, even when caused by railroad, is valid); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Thorton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 195-97, 288 N.W.2d 226, 227-28 (1939) (sewer contrac-
tor's indemnity bond construed to cover property damage to third parties caused by
railroad companies' negligence is valid); cf. Comment, Torts: Contribution and Indemnity
in Cases of Absolute Statutory Liability-In Search of the Minnesota Rule, 1 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. Rzv. 185, 202 (1974) (court's exclusive dependence on public policy in Zerby v.
Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 143, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1973)).
176. Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
177. See cases cited note 175 supra.
178. With respect to contractual indemnity, Professor Williston states:
There is no reason for denying a contract operation according to its terms,
unless its tendency is to provide immunity for future conduct that is tortious or
opposed to public policy.
And if future tortious conduct does not involve serious moral obliquity and
there is no reason to suppose that the contract will induce such conduct, a
contract for freedom from liability for it is not invalid.
15 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTAACTS § 1750 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972)
[Vol. 5
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agree that the appropriate inquiry in determining whether the indem-
nity contract violates public policy is whether the contract will induce
the tortious act.""0 Accordingly, if part of the consideration of the con-
tract is the commission of a tort, the contract violates public policy and
is unenforceable. 5 ' On the other hand, the indemnity contract is en-
forceable if the tort is only an undesired possibility after entering into
the contract."2 Although the public policy doctrine may create some
confusion, the doctrine provides courts with a useful tool for refusing
to enforce socially undesirable contracts.
In summary, all of the Hendrickson rules, with the exception of Rule
4, are viable;"' at least one of the rules must be satisfied as a threshold
for obtaining indemnity.1 ' Whether satisfying a Hendrickson rule is the
sole requirement for obtaining indemnity is uncertain, however, because
of the court's use of the independent and concurrent negligence and the
active-passive negligence tests. These tests are discussed below.
b. Independent and Concurrent Negligence
On several occasions the Minnesota court has refused to grant in-
demnity when the indemnitee's negligence was independent from and
concurrent with the negligence of the proposed indemnitor.x5 Although
(footnotes omitted). He continues: "An attempted exemption from liability for a future
intentional tort or for a future willful act or one of gross negligence is void . Id. at §
1750A.
The general rule has also been summarized as follows:
lIlt is now the prevailing rule that a contract may validly provide for the
indemnification of one against, or relieve him from liability for, his own future
acts of negligence .... Some courts have reached this result on the basis of
an analogy between such contracts and insurance policies, while others reach
the same result independently, as by simply stating that such contracts do not
violate public policy. However, such contracts are invalid if it can be shown that
they tend to promote a breach of duty to the public.
41 AM. JuR. 2d Indemnity § 9 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
179. RESTATEMENT OF CONTrACTS § 572 (1932), reads:
A bargain to indemnify another against the consequences of committing a
tortious act is illegal unless the performance of the tortious act is only an unde-
sired possibility in the performance of the bargain, and the bargain does not
tend to induce the act.
180. See notes 178-79 supra.
181. See Comment, supra note 175, at 202.
182. Id. at 202-03.
183. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 366-67
(1977).
184. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 366.
185. See, e.g., Kenyon v. F.M.C. Corp., 286 Minn. 283, 287, 176 N.W.2d 69, 71-72 (1970)
(retailer whose negligence was failure to lubricate the idler arm of a lawn mower held not
entitled to indemnity from the lawn mower's manufacturer); Thill v. Modern Erecting
Co., 272 Minn. 217, 227-28, 136 N.W.2d 677, 684-85 (1965) (general contractor held not
entitled to indemnity from subcontractor where negligence of both parties concurred to
cause injury to plaintiff).
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difficult to define, "independent and concurrent negligence" has been
interpreted to mean negligence that occurs at the same time as another
co-tortfeasor's negligence but in a different manner."' Thus, when a co-
tortfeasor failed to exercise reasonable care in the supervision of its
subcontractor and a third party breached a duty to supply reasonably
safe equipment, indemnity was inappropriate because both acts con-
tributed to the injured party's loss.'5 7
The continued validity of the independent and concurrent negligence
test is questionable, however, because the test arose only in Rule 4
situations, which now are treated as contribution actions." This Note
proposes, however, that the independent and concurrent negligence test
should be utilized in conjunction with the other Hendrickson rules to
determine whether indemnity is proper. For example, under
Hendrickson's first rule, when an automobile owner loans an automobile
to another who subsequently has an accident, the owner may be indem-
nified after being found liable under the Financial Responsibility Act."'9
If the owner is also independently at fault for negligently entrusting the
vehicle to the driver, however, indemnity should be unavailable because
the indemnitee's negligence is independent from and concurrent with
the indemnitor's negligence. Using the independent and concurrent neg-
ligence test in this manner would assist courts and practitioners in de-
termining with an added degree of certainty when indemnity is appro-
priate.
c. The Active-Passive Dichotomy
In addition to the Hendrickson rules and the independent and concur-
rent negligence test, the Minnesota court on occasion has applied an
active-passive test to determine whether indemnity was appropriate.'"
186. See Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 272 Minn. 217, 227-28, 136 N.W.2d 677, 684-85
(1965).
187. See id.
188. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc,, - Minn . . 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68
(1977).
189. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1976) (the driver of an automobile is deemed the owner's
agent for purposes of assessing tort liability). For a situation in which indemnity was
granted after a co-tortfeasor was held liable under this statute, see Lunderberg v. Bier-
man, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
190. See Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361, 216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974)
(distributor entitled to indemnity from manufacturer for injuries to plaintiff caused by
malfunctioning safety device on tire changing machine), overruled on other grounds,
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.l
(1977); Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 351-52, 215 N.W.2d 810, 813-14 (1974) (bus
driver entitled to indemnity when his negligence consisted of failing to supervise properly
and where student-passenger defendants were actively negligent), overruled on other
grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68,
368 n.11 (1977); Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 100, 193 N.W.2d 305,
310-11 (1971) (contractor entitled to indemnity where contractor's liability was vicarious);
[Vol. 5
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The active-passive test requires that when the negligence of co-
tortfeasors is characterized as "active" their negligence must be com-
pared under the comparative negligence statute."' Such a comparison
renders indemnity inappropriate."' Conversely, if a co-tortfeasor's negli-
gence is passive and the negligence of other co-tortfeasors is active, the
passively negligent co-tortfeasor is afforded indemnity."1
3
When attempting to ascertain whether a party's negligence is active
or passive, the Minnesota court apparently views the quality of the
indemnitee's negligence as the crucial element. This was most clearly
set forth in Hillman v. Ellingson, "I a personal injury suit arising out of
horseplay on a school bus. Under the Hillman decision, the right of
indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and secondary
liability of two persons, each of whom is legally responsible to an injured
party."' The court explained that the difference between active and
passive negligence has nothing to do with percentages of negligence.91
Rather, the distinction hinges upon the character or kind of wrong that
causes an injury and the nature of the legal obligation owed to a victim
by each co-tortfeasor."7 Unfortunately, defining the active-passive test
Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 365, 63 N.W.2d 355, 366 (1954) (automobile owner
entitled to indemnity for liability imposed by Financial Responsibility Act).
191. See Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 351, 215 N.W.2d 810, 813 (1974) (bus
driver's failure to supervise student passengers characterized as "passive negligence"),
overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255
N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.l1 (1977).
192. 298 Minn. at 351, 215 N.W.2d at 813.
193. See Jensvold, supra note 6, at 732.
194. 298 Minn. 346, 215 N.W.2d 810 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v.
Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.l (1977).
195. 298 Minn. at 350-51, 215 N.W.2d at 812-13. In awarding indemnity the court
stated:
In the case before us, the jury found that the bus driver was negligent in failing
to properly supervise the children on the bus. Although he is legally responsible
for injuries caused by student passengers which he could have prevented by
using ordinary care, he is only secondarily liable for their negligent acts ...
We might also characterize the negligence of the driver as "passive" and the
wrongdoing of Ellingson and Kleven as "active."
Thus, given the facts of the case, if we look to one of the guidelines of
Hendrickson, or describe the duty and hence the liability of the bus driver as
"secondary" and that of the two students as "primary," or characterize the
negligence of the bus driver as passive and that of the two students as active,
. I . we conclude that indemnity should be awarded.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
It is interesting to note that the court could have framed the bus driver's actions as
passive or active. For example, the bus driver may have passively failed to look to the back
of the bus, or he might have actively concentrated on traffic, thereby not being able to
view the horseplay that resulted in the plaintiff's injuries.
196. See id. at 351-52, 215 N.W.2d at 813-14.
197. See id.
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in this manner does not clarify the method in which the test is applied.
Commentators' and jurists' often have criticized the active-passive
dichotomy because the test presupposes the ideal of an indemnitee who
was not at fault, which is often a misconception in loss allocation sys-
tems sophisticated enough to utilize comparative negligence principles.
This criticism is worth noting because the sharing of liability through
contribution, rather than the shifting of liability through indemnity, is
the only way Minnesota's system of loss allocation can remain consis-
tent with the recent legislative mandate that loss be allocated based on
relative fault.
Determining the exact scope of the active-passive test may be a moot
question, however, because, once again, the test was used almost exclu-
sively in Rule 4 situations.21' In the few instances in which the active-
passive test was used in other than Rule 4 situations, the court's refer-
198. See Keeton, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 27 INS. COUNSEL J.
630, 632 (1960); Leflar, supra note 2, at 156; Sherk, supra note 3, at 64-66; Comment,
Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in New York: Active and Passive Negligence and
Impleader, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 782, 787 (1959-1960); Comment, Products Liability-
Non-Contractual Indemnity-The Effect of the Active-Passive Negligence Theory in
Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REv. 382, 391 (1976).
199. One New York trial judge, rebelling against the active-passive dichotomy, stated:
I desire to go beyond the matter of fictions and semantics, even though the
words and the symbols may cloak principles of moral and natural justice striv-
ing for justifiable recognition. The unanalyzed terminology of "active" and
"passive" conduct and of "actual" and "constructive" notice results, I fear, in
beclouding the crucial issue. The phrasing shows what confusion will arise if
we attempt to fit specific cases into the bare cubicles of easy nomenclature.
Confusion made worse confounded is apparent from the fact that the principal
authorities are relied upon with equal vigor by each antagonist.
Falk v. Crystal Hall, Inc., 200 Misc. 979, 984, 105 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70-71 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd
mem., 279 A.D. 1071, 113 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1952). An Illinois appellate judge viewed the
distinction between active and passive negligence on the presence or absence of motion,
as follows:
We have already discussed the confusion arising in large part from the fact that
the vocabulary of negligence law is wholly inadequate to meet its current com-
plexities. Certainly the courts in the cases we have cited did not intend any such
limited meaning for the phrase "passive or technical negligence." In Pennsyl-
vania Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250 I1. App. 330, the railroad was consid-
ered passively negligent although the railroad employee actively pulled a rope
that brought down the weight on his fellow-employee. In United States v. Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 10 Cir., 171 F.2d 377, a pile of material
was the obstruction and the engine was moving, still the railroad was held to
be only passively negligent. It is clear that mere motion does not define the
distinction between active and passive negligence.
Gulf, M. & O.R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Il. App. 148, 157, 98 N.E.2d 783,
788 (1951).
200. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 769 (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02).
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ence to the theory was in dictum and was used only to illustrate the
indemnitee's imputed negligence.a2 Therefore, the demise of Rule 4 in-
demnity also may signal the death knell of the active-passive test.
d. Summary
The Minnesota Supreme Court has applied three criteria in determin-
ing whether indemnity should be granted. First, the co-tortfeasor must
satisfy a Hendrickson requirement10 Second, the court occasionally
requires proof that the indemnitee's conduct did not constitute inde-
pendent and concurrent negligence.2 0 4 Finally, the court may require
proof that the indemnitee's negligence is not "active."' ' The active-
passive test, however, actually may be another form of the independent
and concurrent negligence test, as the court appears in both tests to be
searching for some basis upon which to grant indemnity to a co-
tortfeasor. After Tolbert, however, meeting a Hendrickson requirement
may be the sole threshold for obtaining indemnity because the latter two
requirements mainly arose in the now overruled Rule 4 situations.z'
Although the active-passive dichotomy should be viewed as archaic,
the independent and concurrent negligence test should be used in con-
junction with the remaining Hendrickson rules to determine whether
indemnity is appropriate. Thus, indemnity should be awarded only
when the indemnitee's actions fall within one of Hendrickson's remain-
ing rules and the indemnitee's negligence is not independent from and
concurrent with the negligence of the proposed indemnitor.
1H. THE UPHEAVAL: RECENT JUDICIAL REVAMPING OF MINNESOTA
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY LAW
In an attempt to resolve the uncertainty as to which doctrine was
applicable, the Minnesota Supreme Court established guidelines for the
implementation of contribution and indemnity. 201 These guidelines have
202. The active-passive distinction was made in Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292
Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971) and Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d
355 (1954). In both cases, the party seeking indemnity was liable only because the negli-
gence of another was imputed as a matter of law.
203. See Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372-73, 104
N.W.2d 843, 848 (1960) (setting forth five rules for the implementation of indemnity and
requiring common liability between co-tortfeasors before indemnity is appropriate),
overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn -... 255 N.W.2d 362,
367-68, 368 n.l (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
204. See notes 185-87 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 190-202 supra and accompanying text.
206. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. - - 255 N.W.2d 362, 366-67
(1977) (explaining the requirements that must be met to obtain indemnity in Minnesota
without requiring the active-passive or independent-concurrent tests to be met).
207. See Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372-73, 104
N.W.2d 843, 848 (1960), overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -,
-, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977).
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been altered significantly, however, and in some respects completely
overruled, by several recent Minnesota decisions.20 8 To help explain the
current status of Minnesota contribution and indemnity law, the cases
causing the upheaval in tort loss allocation concepts will be discussed.
A. Contribution: Apparent Abolition of the Common Liability
Requirement
1. The Lambertson Question
The requirement that a common liability must exist between co-
tortfeasors before contribution is proper may have been abrogated by
the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Lambertson v. Cincinnati
Corp.2'" In that case the injured party's arm was caught in a machine
press. After receiving workers' compensation benefits, the injured party
sued Cincinnati Corporation, the manufacturer of the press, alleging
strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.t 0 Cincinnati Corpo-
ration impleaded the injured party's employer arguing that the em-
ployer negligently failed to install safety devices .
2
1
The jury found all parties to be causally negligent, apportioning fif-
teen percent to the injured party, twenty-five percent to Cincinnati
Corporation, and sixty percent to the employer.2 12 Because the em-
ployer's liability to the employee under the workers' compensation act
is exclusive,2 13 a common liability did not exist between Cincinnati Cor-
poration and the employer.2 14 Therefore, the trial court refused to grant
Cincinnati Corporation's request for contribution.2 1 1 On appeal, how-
ever, the supreme court rejected the argument that contribution was
inappropriate, stating: "Contribution is a flexible, equitable remedy
208. See notes 209-70 infra and accompanying text.
209. - Minn. - , 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). But see Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No.
48329 (Minn., filed Feb. 9, 1979). For a discussion of Hart, see note 229.1 infra.
210. - Minn. at -, 257 N.W.2d at 682.
211. See id.
212. Id. at -, 257 N.W.2d at 683.
213. See MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1976). Under this statute, the employer's liability for
injuries suffered by his employee, while within the scope of his employment, is exclusively
under the Workers' Compensation Act. Thus, the employer has no liability in tort to an
injured employee. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368,
374-75, 104 N.W.2d 843, 849 (1960) ("Since workmen's compensation statutes provide that
the obligations thereunder are the only liability of the employer to the employee, ...
there is no common liability involving the employer and third party in such situations;
and, therefore, there is no ground for allowing contribution."), overruled in part on other
grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. _, _, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68,
368 n.11 (1977) (abrogating Rule 4).
214. See - Minn. at - , 257 N.W.2d at 688. The court did note, however, that the
employer is liable to the employee through the fixed no-fault workers' compensation
system and that the third party is liable to the employee through recovery in a common
law tort suit. See id.
215. See id. at -, 257 N.W.2d at 683.
[Vol. 5
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designed to accomplish a fair allocation of loss among parties. Such a
remedy should be utilized to achieve fairness on particular facts, unfet-
tered by outworn technical concepts like common liability.
2 1 6
Although Lambertson may be limited to contribution cases in which
workers' compensation is paid, the court's attack on the common liabil-
ity requirement is broad enough to extend to all contribution situations.
Such an extension would be consistent with the court's previous deci-
sions permitting contribution when a co-tortfeasor has secured a cove-
nant not to sue, 21 when the statute of limitations has run against a co-
tortfeasor, 2 1 or when a municipality has a defense based upon the in-
jured party's failure to give timely notice of a claim.
29
An additional reason for giving Lambertson a broad interpretation is
the court's willingness in recent years to limit defenses in tort actions.
For example, sovereign immunity2" and intra-family immunity22' have
been partially abrogated. By limiting these immunities the court has
shown a willingness to increase the number of situations in which contri-
bution is appropriate.
After Lambertson the question remains whether common liability is
completely obviated or whether it will be abrogated on a case-by-case
analysis. In the event the latter procedure is chosen by the court, the
following section of this Note discusses a proposed approach for a case-
by-case analysis.
2. A Proposed Answer to the Lambertson Question
Any comparison of fault between co-tortfeasors who do not share a
common liability to an injured party must start with the premise that,
except for some legal principle, common liability does not exist between
co-tortfeasors without a common liability to an injured party. This
premise clarifies any theoretical difficulties resulting from the principle
that a tortfeasor cannot shift liability to a person from whom an injured
216. Id. at -, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
217. See Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 50
N.W.2d 689 (1951).
218. See Spitzack v. Schumaker, 308 Minn. 143, 145, 241 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1976).
219. See White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 366, 137 N.W.2d 674, 676 (1965), overruled
on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn..... 255 N.W.2d 362,
367-68, 368 n.l (1977).
220. See Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 132, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (1975) (abrogated
state tort immunity effective August 1, 1976); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No.
621, 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962) (abolished governmental tort immun-
ity of school districts, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of government).
221. See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 371-72, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969) (abol-
ished interspousal tort immunity); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d
631, 638 (1968) (abolished immunity of parent from suit by unemancipated child); Baits
v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966) (abolished immunity of unemanci-
pated child from suit by parent).
In general, tort immunities are on the decline. See note 88 supra.
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party could not obtain recovery.2 2 A second premise is that contribu-
tion should be awarded based on the participation of co-tortfeasors in
acts or omissions that are tortious.2' To accommodate an amalgamation
of these two premises, courts must examine each defense that prevents
common liability from existing between co-tortfeasors. If the purposes
underlying the defense would not be defeated by contribution, the rem-
edy should be allowed.
2
Denying contribution only when the policies supporting a defense
preventing common liability from existing between co-tortfeasors are
more important than the need for equitable loss allocation is consistent
with the court's reasoning in Lambertson. Before granting contribution,
the Lambertson court analyzed and balanced the conflicting interests
involved. Thus, the court balanced the employer's interest in paying
only its workers' compensation liability against the manufacturer's in-
terest in paying only that portion of the judgment attributable to its
faulty.2  In other situations the policy of allocating loss in accordance
with relative fault should be balanced against any liability avoidance
policy inherent in the defense asserted. This balancing approach also is
consistent with prior Minnesota cases that have allowed contribution
notwithstanding defenses such as covenants not to sue2 6 and failure to
222. See, e.g., Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829, 839, 107 N.W.2d 682, 687
(1961) ("The whole matter may be summed up in the statement that before there can be
contribution among tortfeasors, there must be tortfeasors."); American Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Moiling, 239 Minn. 74, 79, 57 N.W.2d 847, 851 (1953) (contribution improper in the
absence of common liability between co-tortfeasors).
223. See, e.g., 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 10.2, at 718; Note, supra note
50, at 472.
224. For example, the rationale behind intra-family tort immunities is the belief that
it protects societal interests by preventing discord and strife within the family unit. See
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 122, at 86. Several courts which have retained intra-family
tort immunities have nevertheless allowed contribution against a co-tortfeasor raising a
family immunity as a defense to a tort action. See Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444
F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695,
174 So. 2d 122 (1965); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Fisher v. Diehl,
156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945); Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966).
In so holding, these courts balanced the conflicting equities-the interest in preserving
family harmony against the interest of the co-tortfeasor to only pay that portion of the
judgment attributable to its fault. The Fisher court, in balancing the conflicting interests,
succinctly stated:
The legal unity of husband and wife and the preservation of domestic peace
and felicity between them are desirable things to maintain . . . where they do
not inflict injustice upon outsiders and deprive them of their legal rights.
...To hold otherwise would permit a husband to profit by his own wrongful
or negligent act at the sole expense of the third party.
Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 489, 40 A.2d 912, 917 (1945).
225. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., - Minn. 257 N.W.2d 679, 688
(1977).
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give statutory notice to a dramshop2l7 or a municipal defendant."' In
each case the court determined that the immunity existed only
because of a procedural rule and that justice required that contribution
be allowed." 9
In summary, although Lam bertson apparently abrogated the common
liability prerequisite, common liability still may be required in specific
instances. 21.9 Determining when common liability is a proper prerequis-
ite to a contribution claim requires a balancing of the policies support-
ing the defense against the need for equitable loss allocation.
227. See Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1978). In Hammer-
schmidt the court held that the notice-of-claim provision requiring that notice be given
to the licensee of any licensed liquor establishment within 120 days after an injury, see
MINN. STAT. § 340.951 (1976 & Supp. 1977), is not a condition precedent to a third-party
civil damage action for contribution. See 274 N.W.2d at 82. Although the Hammerschmidt
court appears to have indicated that common liability is a requirement which must be
met before contribution is appropriate in Minnesota, the court allowed contribution
against a defendant who could not be held liable to the injured party because of the
plaintiff's failure to notify that defendant within the 120 days required by the statute. See
id. Thus, whether common liability is necessary before contribution can be applied re-
mains uncertain. But see Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 48329 (Minn., filed Feb. 9,
1979). For a discussion of the Hart case, see note 229.1 infra. In holding that contribution
was allowable, the Hammerschmidt court appears to have balanced the need for prompt
investigation of claims by an alleged dram shop violation and the need for enforcement
of the policy that all wrongdoers must share in the burden of their wrong. See 274 N.W.2d
at 81-83.
228. See White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 372, 137 N.W.2d 674, 680 (1965), overruled
on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn -... 255 N.W.2d 362,
367-68, 368 n.11 (1977).
229. See White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 370-71, 137 N.W.2d 674, 679 (1965),
overruled on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, - 255
N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. &
0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 310, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951).
229.1. After this Note originally had gone to press, the Minnesota Supreme Court de-
cided Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 48329 (Minn., filed Feb. 9, 1979), in which the court
clarified the common liability issue. In Hart, a wrongful death action, the court held that
co-tortfeasors generally must share a common liability to the injured party before contri-
bution will be appropriate. See id., slip op. at 3. The plaintiff, whose husband died in an
airplane crash, first brought a wrongful death action against the pilot of the airplane. The
supreme court affirmed a finding that the pilot was not negligent. See Hart v. Vogt, 306
Minn. 476, 238 N.W.2d 590 (1976). The plaintiff then sued the manufacturer of the
airplane, alleging negligence in the design and manufacture of the airplane. A third-party
action claiming a right to contribution was made against the pilot. Because the verdict
in the first action established that the pilot was not liable to the plaintiff, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the third-party complaint, reasoning
that "only a tortfeasor who is liable for a plaintiff's loss should be required to contribute
to the payment for that loss." Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., slip op. at 4. The court
indicated, however, that when necessary to achieve an equitable result, the common
liability requirement may not have to be satisfied. See id. Thus, the need still exists for a
test to determine the situations in which the absence of common liability will not bar
contribution.
The Hart court also held, however, that the manufacturer could only be held liable for
the portion of damages attributable to its own negligence. See id., slip op. at 6. Thus, if
the jury is the second suit found the pilot to be party at fault, the manufacturer apparently
would receive the same benefits it could obtain in a contribution claim.
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B. Indemnity: Recent Judicial Modifications of Loss Allocation
Principles
As stated above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has rendered several
decisions in the past few years that have dramatically altered tort loss
allocation concepts. Indemnity has undergone a particularly drastic
change. The upheaval in Minnesota indemnity law results from the
holdings and dicta in Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 3" Frey v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co.,23' and Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc.232 Al-
though these cases have little in common factually, an underlying -issue
in each case was the appropriateness of contribution or indemnity when
a co-tortfeasor in a sales chain of distribution was at fault in causing the
injured party's loss.
In Tolbert the court refused to grant indemnity to an installer of a
defective product from a manufacturer whose liability was based on
negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty.2 "1 Subse-
quently, in Frey the supreme court remanded a case involving the sale
of a defective product with orders to the trial court to determine whether
the facts fell within Hendrickson's third or fourth rules." ' Although the
majority opinion was silent as to the effects of a potential breach of
implied warranty, Justice Kelly, in a concurring opinion, stated that
indemnity is proper anytime a nonmanufacturing entity proves that a
manufacturer breached an implied warranty, reasoning that a breach of
an implied warranty falls within Hendrickson's third rule.23 More re-
cently, however, in Busch a strictly liable manufacturer was held to be
entitled to contribution from a negligent co-tortfeasor.23 Logically, then,
a negligent co-tortfeasor should be allowed contribution from a strictly
liable manufacturer. Thus, because strict liability and breach of implied
warranty claims have been viewed as being virtually identical in the
proof needed to sustain recovery,237 Justice Kelly's concurring opinion in
Frey, in which he would allow indemnity to a negligent co-tortfeasor
from a manufacturer who breaches an implied warranty, appears to be
230. - Minn. - , 255 N.W.2d 362 (1977).
231. 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977).
232. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
233. See - Minn. at - , 255 N.W.2d at 368.
234. See 258 N.W.2d at 788-89.
235. See id. at 789-91 (Kelly, J., concurring specially).
236. See 262 N.W.2d at 393-94.
237. See Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 475, 246 N.W.2d 687,
690 (1976) (trial judge's refusal "to instruct on . . . warranty theories because . . . the
instructions would have been mere surplusage, redundant in view of the instructions on
strict liability" affirmed); Worden v. Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651
(1976) (burden of proof for strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence is the same);
Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 89-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69-71 (1970) (legal
theories of strict liability and breach of implied warranty of merchantability are closely
related, involving similar proof).
I Vol. 5
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inconsistent with the court's holdings in Tolbert and Busch. In light of
the uncertainty created by this trilogy of recent indemnity cases, each
case will be examined individually, and a synthesis of their holdings will
be offered."'
In Tolbert the Minnesota Supreme Court significantly narrowed the
scope of the indemnity remedy. In that case the injured party, while
standing on a boxcar, was knocked to the ground when an overhead tube
feeding grain into the boxcar fell.29 The overhead tube was installed by
Voldco, Inc. but was manufactured by Gerber Industries, Inc. " , The jury
returned a verdict for the injured party, attributing one hundred percent
of the negligence to the manufacturer and the installer.24" ' The jury also
found that both co-tortfeasors had breached implied warranties and
were strictly liable."' The trial court therefore awarded indemnity to the
installer, reasoning that the facts satisfied Hendrickson's fourth rule.
2
11
On appeal, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled
Hendrickson's fourth rule, holding that allocation of loss should be
based on relative fault, and remanded the case for a new trial on the
limited issue of apportionment of damages.2 ' In so holding, the court
emphasized that the remaining Hendrickson rules were still valid.
245
Thus, after Tolbert, if both co-tortfeasors are found negligent the appro-
priate remedy should be contribution, not indemnity. Unfortunately,
the clarity that Tolbert brought to Minnesota indemnity law was short-
lived because of apparent inconsistent language used in the subsequent
case of Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co.2"'
In Frey, the injured party brought an action to recover damages
caused when a space heater malfunctioned in a trailer in which he raised
chinchillas.117 Montgomery Ward, the retailer, impleaded McGraw-
Edison, the manufacturer of the space heater, alleging a right to contri-
bution or indemnity from McGraw-Edison if Montgomery Ward should
be found liable to the injured party.2 8 The trial court, however, granted
a directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer, thereby foreclosing any
contribution or indemnity claim.2 9 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's order granting a directed verdict, reason-
238. See notes 239-70 infra and accompanying text.
239. See - Minn. at - , 255 N.W.2d at 365.
240. See id. at - , 255 N.W.2d at 364.
241. Id.
242. Id. at - , 255 N.W.2d at 368 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
243. See id. at - , 255 N.W.2d at 364 (trial court relied on recent Minnesota Rule 4
cases in awarding indemnity).
244. See id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 367-68.
245. See id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 366-67.
246. 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977).
247. See id. at 785.
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ing that the manufacturer may have breached a duty when it failed to
place a warning in the owner's manual.20 The court determined that by
failing to include this warning McGraw-Edison may have breached a
foreseeable duty owed to Montgomery Ward and therefore may have
placed the case within Hendrickson's third rule.25" '
In remanding Frey for a new trial the supreme court instructed the
trial court to determine whether the case fell within Hendrickson's third
or fourth rule. 252 Although the majority opinion did not give the trial
court any guidance in making the determination, guidance was offered
in Justice Kelly's concurring opinion.32 Specifically, Justice Kelly ex-
plained that the duty to which Rule 3 refers is similar to the duty owed
not to breach an implied warranty."' Thus, Montgomery Ward, though
negligent, should be entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer if the
trial court finds the manufacturer breached an implied warranty. 55 So
formulated, Justice Kelly's interpretation of Hendrickson's third rule
appears to be that a breach of an implied warranty permits a retailer to
be indemnified as a matter of law regardless of the retailer's negligence.
Although Justice Kelly interpreted Hendrickson's third rule in a con-
curring opinion, his views might be the law of the case because the
majority opinion appears to refer to his opinion with approval. 2'6 If so,
the rule of loss allocation based on relative fault enunciated in Tolbert
appears to have been severely limited, if not abrogated. Consequently,
in product liability cases, breach of an implied warranty may automati-
cally place the case in Rule 3.
Three months after the decision in Frey, in which the notion that loss
allocation should be based on relative fault apparently was rejected, the
Minnesota Supreme Court appears to have returned to the concept of
loss allocation based on relative fault in Busch v. Busch Construction,
Inc.257 Busch involved six consolidated personal injury actions arising
out of a single vehicle accident.58 The accident occurred when the steer-
ing column on a car driven by Lando Busch locked, causing the car to
go out of control.2 15 The jury found Busch fifteen percent at fault and
General Motors Corporation, the manufacturer of the automobile,
eighty-five percent at fault.
260
The primary issue in Busch was whether the contributory negligence
250. See id. at 787-89.
251. See id. at 788.
252. Id. at 788-89.
253. See id. at 789-91 (Kelly, J., concurring specially).
254. See id. at 789-90.
255. See id. at 790-91.
256. See id. at 788.
257. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
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of an injured party could be compared with the strict liability of a co-
tortfeasor under the comparative negligence statute."6 ' Answering the
question in the affirmative, the court held that a co-tortfeasor who is
strictly liable is entitled to contribution from a negligent co-tortfeasor
whose liability arises from negligence other than failure to discover or
guard against product defects. 62
A synthesis of Tolbert, Frey, and Busch yields the following conclu-
sions.11 First, Hendrickson's fourth rule clearly is abrogated.2" ' Second,
in future cases, when co-tortfeasors have been negligent their negligence
will be apportioned under the comparative negligence or comparative
fault statutes, each co-tortfeasor found negligent bearing a share of the
loss in proportion to that co-tortfeasor's degree of fault.' 5 The court thus
appears to be merging the remedies of contribution and indemnity into
a single remedy of comparative fault.2"1 Third, under Busch the fault of
261. See id. at 393-94.
262. See id. at 394.
263. Drawing any conclusions from Tolbert, Frey, and Busch is difficult because the
degree of interrelation between these cases is uncertain. The following chart illustrates
the similarities and differences between these cases:
Tolbert Frey Busch
PARTY Installer Retailer Consumer
SEEKING
INDEMNITY








LIABILITY OF Negligence, Court remanded Negligence, strict
PROPOSED strict liabili- because liability liability
INDEMNITOR ty, breach of could be based on
PREDICATED implied warranty negligence or
UPON breach of implied
warranty
LIABILITY OF Negligence, Negligence Negligence
PROPOSED strict liabili-
INDEMNITEE ty, breach of
PREDICATED implied warranty
UPON
264. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn . . 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68
(1977).
265. See id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 367-68.
266. See Jensvold, supra note 6, at 739-40 (suggesting that "comparative responsibil-
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the co-tortfeasors is compared regardless of the theory upon which li-
ability is predicated.2 7 Loss apportionment is then calculated according
to the comparative negligence or comparative fault statutes." Under
Frey, however, a breach of duty by the indemnitor may still entitle the
indemnitee to indemnity based on Hendrickson's third rule.16 1 Finally,
Frey renders uncertain the ambit of Hendrickson's third rule, leaving
to future litigation the issue of whether the co-tortfeasor claiming in-
demnity under Hendrickson's third rule must remain free of fault with
respect to the injured party's loss.7 0
IV. THE FUTURE OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY IN MINNESOTA
Recent years have witnessed both case law and statutory changes
affecting contribution and indemnity in Minnesota. In the area of con-
tribution law, whether common liability between co-tortfeasors will be
required in all situations before contribution may be permitted is uncer-
tain 711 As discussed previously, the court appears to apply a balancing
test when confronted with this question .2 2 In the area of indemnity law,
the validity of Hendrickson's rules may be questioned because of appar-
ent inconsistencies in recent Minnesota decisions. 273 In addition to the
questions raised by recent case law, the Minnesota Legislature recently
enacted a comparative fault statute274 that will have a significant impact
on the remedies of contribution and indemnity.7
5
A. Hendrickson's First, Second and Fifth Rules
Hendrickson's first and second rules should be maintained, as they
permit indemnity to a party not personally at fault in causing the in-
jured party's loss. 2 6 In Rule 1 cases, liability is imposed on the party
seeking indemnity because of the conduct of another.277 Under Rule 2,
liability is imposed on the party seeking indemnity as a result of the
indemnitee's justifiable reliance upon the representations made by an-
267. See 262 N.W.2d at 394.
268. See id. at 393-94.
269. See 258 N.W.2d at 788-89.
270. For a discussion of Frey and the scope of Hendrickson's third rule in light of the
amendments to the comparative negligence statute, see notes 309-13 infra and accompa-
nying text.
271. See notes 209-29.1 supra and accompanying text.
272. See notes 222-29.1 supra and accompanying text.
273. For a discussion of the apparent inconsistencies in recent Minnesota decisions, see
notes 230-70 supra and accompanying text.
274. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 839 (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02).
275. See notes 299-314 infra and accompanying text.
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other.118 Under both rules, the fundamental principle that a party guilty
of injurious misconduct must indemnify those without fault supports
the continued granting of indemnityY5 Additionally, Hendrickson's
fifth rule should be maintained because indemnity contracts play an
important role in allocating risks equitably among societal members.'"
For example, few companies will manufacture products unless insur-
ance for product liability suits remains available.251
B. Hendrickson's Third Rule
Justice Kelly's concurring opinion in Frey indicated that the duty to
which Hendrickson's third rule referred is similar to the duty owed not
to breach an implied warranty.2 2 Under this formulation of the rule,
nonmanufacturing entities are entitled to indemnity from any entity
higher in the sales chain of distribution when such nonmanufacturing
entities reasonably rely on an implied warranty that the manufacturer
breaches3m Indemnity then may be granted even though the retailer,
wholesaler, or other nonmanufacturing entity is negligent or strictly
liable.3' The reasons for allowing indemnity based on this theory are
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 197, 288 N.W. 226,
228 (1939) (indemnity contracts are "legitimate as insurance"); Comment, supra note 175,
at 205 (indemnity contracts help to spread loss among societal members).
281. See WALL ST. J., June 3, 1976, at 1, col. 6, which describes the dissolution of Havir
Manufacturing Company of St. Paul, Minnesota because "replacement insurance" would
have been too expensive. The company's product liability insurance annual premiums had
climbed from $2,000 in 1970 to a projected cost of $200,000, or 10% of its annual sales, in
1976. Id. Havir's resulting liquidation idled most of its 80 employees. Id.
282. See Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782,789-91 (Minn. 1977) (Kelly,
J., concurring specially).
283. See id. at 790-91.
284. This would be the result if Justice Kelly's concurring opinion was the law of the
case. See notes 253-55 supra and accompanying text. Justice Kelly's reasoning is theoreti-
cally consistent with the cases in which indemnity is granted to a retailer or other nonman-
ufacturing entity from a manufacturer held negligent or strictly liable based on an invoca-
tion of the active-passive test. See, e.g., Guarnieri v. Kewanee-Ross Corp., 270 F.2d 575,
579 (2d Cir. 1959) (breach of nondelegable duty to inspect not passive negligence); Lopez
v. Brackett Stripping Mach. Co., 303 F. Supp. 669, 670-71 (N.D. Il1. 1969) (manufacturer's
strict liability for defective product not "passive, secondary or merely technical negli-
gence"); Roberts v. Richland Mfg. Co., 260 F. Supp. 274, 276 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (manu-
facturer charged with negligent design and assembly and breach of warranty "active joint
tort feasor"); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 96-97, 179 N.W.2d 64,72 (1970)
(sale of defective tires is passive negligence entitling retailer to indemnity from strictly
liable manufacturer); cf. Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1000, 309
N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (1974) (liability for defective product "is qualitatively active" but
strictly liable manufacturer is outside active-passive test in indemnity action against user
for policy reasons) (emphasis in original).
One commentator has noted "a general reluctance . .. to allow a manufacturer to
obtain indemnity from his buyer even though it may seem that the manufacturer is less
47
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threefold. First, retailers are at the mercy of manufacturers with respect
to the knowledge of dangers that inhere in the products they sell.,
Second, manufacturers are in a centralized point in the distributive
chain and therefore are the most efficient entity to take preventive
measures.2 Finally, manufacturers can best bear the cost of product-
related injuries through insurance or by including the cost of injuries in
the cost of their products.2s7
Although the preceeding theories may support attributing a greater
share of the loss to manufacturers, several reasons exist for not allowing
indemnity merely because an implied warranty has been breached.
First, fitting a breach of implied warranty into Hendrickson's third rule
is inconsistent with Tolbert, in which contribution was considered to be
the appropriate remedy despite a breach of an implied warranty by the
manufacturer.28 Second, the Busch court held that liability should be
apportioned in strict liability cases,n' which essentially are similar in
at fault." Note, supra note 129, at 620. The author concludes:
There is a tendency for the courts to say that if the manufacturer is negligent
at all, he is actively negligent. The manufacturer assembles the parts and sends
the finished product into the flow of commerce. He is not a mere conduit, and
he therefore has the original duty to inspect. The courts apparently feel that if
a party is later injured by a defect caused by someone's negligence, the manufac-
turer should not be able to deny that he had a substantial part in causing the
injury.
Id. For an example of this approach, see McClish v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 266 F.
Supp. 987, 990-91 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (manufacturer's "concurrent negligence" prevents
indemnity in absence of active-passive test).
285. See Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 200-01, 491 P.2d 1346,
1350 (1971) (retailer indemnified for reliance on manufacturer's representations).
286. See Comment, Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota
Apparently Adopts the Latent-Patent Doctrine, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241, 242 (1977).
The responsibility of the manufacturer to provide feasible safety precautions is illustrated
by recent decisions in which manufacturers were held liable for failure to provide safety
devices that prevent industrial machine operators from suffering injury because of mo-
mentary inadvertance. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1972), noted in 86 HARV. L. REv. 923 (1973).
287. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500
(1967). In discussing the rationale for strict liability under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
Toms § 402A (1965), the McCormack court stated:
[Slubjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of negligence or privity
of contract, as the rule intends, imposes the cost of injury resulting from a
defective product upon the maker, who can both most effectively reduce or
eliminate the hazard to life and health, and absorb and pass on such costs,
instead of upon the consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means
necessary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of injury or its
disastrous consequences.
278 Minn. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
288. See notes 239-44 supra and accompanying text.
289. See 262 N.W.2d at 393-94. The court, however, excluded from its holding a con-
sumer's negligent failure to inspect a product and failure to guard against defects. Id.
[Vol. 5
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their proof requirements to implied warranty cases."" Third, allowing
indemnity for breach of an implied warranty dangerously insulates re-
tailers and wholesalers from liability.21 Those entities having the great-
est contact with consumers thus could promote products regardless of
their dangerous condition. 25 2 Fourth, accepting Frey's indemnity theory
permits retailers and wholesalers to avoid contribution in what would
have been a Hendrickson Rule 4 situation merely by asserting a breach
of a duty owed."' Finally, if Frey stands for the proposition that a
showing of implied warranty justifies indemnity, the court's opinion in
Tolbert is rendered meaningless, because Tolbert necessitates ignoring
implied warranty and strict liability findings when co-tortfeasors are
found negligent. 2"
Thus, persuasive reasons exist for overruling Frey if that decision is
interpreted to mean that indemnity is proper as a matter of law anytime
a co-tortfeasor proves that another co-tortfeasor has breached an im-
plied warranty. If Frey's interpretation of Hendrickson's third rule is
rejected, the question remains whether Rule 3 should be retained and,
if so, what situations the rule encompasses. Previous Rule 3 cases in-
volved situations in which the court granted indemnity based on an
indemnitor's breach of a nondelegable duty.29 Because the indemnitee
290. See Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller'Co., 310 Minn. 471, 475, 246 N.W.2d 687,
690 (1976) (trial judge's refusal "to instruct on . . . warranty theories because . . . the
instructions would have been mere surplusage, redundant in view of the instructions on
strict liability" affirmed); Worden v. Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651,
(1976) (burden of proof for strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence is the same);
Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 89-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69-71 (1970) (legal
theories of strict liability and breach of implied warranty of merchantability are closely
related, involving similar proof).
291. See, e.g., Jensvold, supra note 6, at 738-39; Note, supra note 30, at 85. Justice
Kelly's concurring opinion in Frey, apparently suggesting that "reasonable reliance" on
the manufacturer's warranty is necessary before indemnity is appropriate, see 258 N.W.2d
at 790-91, may alleviate this problem.
292. See Note, supra note 30, at 85. Also note that Justice Kelly's interpretation of
Hendrickson's third rule does not find support in prior Minnesota case law, because none
of the five cases cited by the court, see 258 Minn. at 373 n.18, 104 N.W.2d at 848 n.18,
dealt with a breach of implied warranty. See Kahler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 204 F.2d
804 (8th Cir. 1953) (indemnity awarded against defendant who conducted marksmanship
show and contracted to keep gun zone free of spectators); Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn.
495, 83 N.W.2d 252 (1957) (indemnity denied between road construction contractor and
motorist); Dehn v. S. Brand Coal & Oil Co., 241 Minn. 237,63 N.W.2d 6 (1954) (indemnity
awarded against lessee based on breach of implied covenant to return premises in as good
condition as when received); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140
Minn. 229, 167 N.W. 800 (1918) (indemnity awarded against defendant for failure to
securely fasten wire on pole in joint control of indemnitor and indemnitee), overruled,
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. - , -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll
(1977); Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698 (1883) (indemnity
awarded for failure to exercise reasonable diligence in repairing bridge).
293. See Steenson, Products Liability-Minnesota, in TORTS UPDATE: RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTs IN THE LAw 67-68 (1978).
294. See id. at 67.
295. See Kahler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1953) (indemnity
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in these cases apparently was also at fault, Rule 3 probably should be
abrogated by the Minnesota court. The basis for this suggestion is two-
fold. First, because the court has never enunciated a standard for deter-
mining which Rule 3 duties are nondelegable, the type of case that
properly falls within Hendrickson's third rule cannot be determined in
advance. Second, awarding indemnity to a party at fault in causing the
injured party's loss is inconsistent with the recent legislative mandate
that indemnity is proper only when the indemnitee is without fault. 9
C. Statutory Loss Allocation in Minnesota
In recent years the Minnesota Legislature also has addressed the
problem of allocating loss in tort claims. In 1969 a comparative negli-
gence statute was enacted, which substantially changed Minnesota's
prior loss allocation system by permitting some injured parties who were
negligent to recover part of their loss."7 More recently, on April 5, 1978,
awarded against defendant who conducted marksmanship show and contracted to keep
gun zone free of spectators); Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d 252 (1957)
(indemnity denied between road construction contractor and motorist); Dehn v. S. Brand
Coal & Oil Co., 241 Minn. 237, 63 N.W.2d 6 (1954) (indemnity awarded against lessee
based on breach of implied covenant to return premises in as good condition as when
received); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140 Minn. 229, 167 N.W.
800 (1918) (indemnity awarded against defendant for failure to securely fasten wire on pole
in joint control of indemnitor and indemnitee), overruled, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc.,
_ Minn. -, -, 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.11 (1977); Minneapolis Mill Co. v.
Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698 (1883) (indemnity awarded for failure to exercise
reasonable diligence in repairing bridge).
296. See notes 303-12 infra and accompanying text.
297. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 604.01 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-7, 1978 Minn. Laws 839).
Prior to the enactment of the Minnesota comparative negligence statute, contributory
negligence was an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Rosin v. International Harvester Co., 262
Minn. 445, 454, 115 N.W.2d 50, 56 (1962) (burden of proving plaintiff's contributory
negligence in not maintaining vehicle brakes rests with defendant); Lyon v. Dr. Scholl's
Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 251 Minn. 285, 296, 87 N.W.2d 651, 659 (1958) (when the record
failed to disclose negligent conduct by plaintiff, trial court properly refused to submit issue
of plaintiffs contributory negligence to jury). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, §
65, at 416. The application of the defense utilizes the reasonable person standard. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463-464 (1965).
If successfully established, contributory negligence will bar an injured party from re-
covering damages. See, e.g., Zuber v. Northern Pac. Ry., 246 Minn. 157, 171-72, 74
N.W.2d 641, 652 (1956) (plaintiff injured when baggage fell from shelf); Peterson v. Doll,
184 Minn. 213, 215, 238 N.W. 324, 325 (1931) (defendant caused collision when he stopped
car suddenly without giving a signal). If the injured party was negligent and such negli-
gence was the proximate cause of his injury and this was the only conclusion to be drawn
from the evidence, a directed verdict against the injured party was proper. See, e.g.,
Mortenson v. Hindahl, 247 Minn. 356, 361, 77 N.W.2d 185, 188 (1956) (negligence of child
riding pony that stepped in front of oncoming car not clear as a matter of law); Standafer
v. First Nat'l Bank, 243 Minn. 442, 448-49, 68 N.W.2d 362, 366-67 (1955) (negligence of
mover who fell from top of elevator not clear as a matter of law).
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the Legislature amended the comparative negligence statute, substan-
tially changing its loss allocation provisions.2 18 Due to the relative youth
of this statute, its provisions have not yet been construed. The following
section of this Note will explain the portions of the statute affecting
contribution and indemnity claims and will propose possible solutions
to loss allocation problems that the statute may generate.
1. Statutory Changes Affecting Contribution Claims
Under the comparative negligence statute, as at common law, the
insolvency of a co-tortfeasor is irrelevant in computing the injured
party's recovery because the right to contribution does not affect the
injured party's substantive right to relief."' Thus, for cases arising be-
Because of the harshness inherent in a doctrine that denied compensation to a negligent
injured party, courts devised a number of exceptions to the contributory negligence rule.
See generally W. PROSSER. supra note 1, § 65, at 18. Although some of these exceptions
allowed an injured party to recover notwithstanding his failure to exercise due care, id. §
67, they too often created harsh results of full or no recovery. Id. Apparently, the Minne-
sota Legislature enacted a comparative negligence law in response to the severity of the
doctrine of contributory negligence and the failure of doctrines such as last clear chance
to consistently provide equitable results.
For a general discussion of the comparative negligence doctrine, see C. HEFT & C. HErr,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1971) (primarily Wisconsin law); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NE..IGENCE (1974) (texts of the various statutes and a good bibliography).
298. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 840 (to be codified as MINN.
STAT. § 604.02). Interestingly, the purpose of the amendments to the comparative negli-
gence statute is to combat the mounting costs of products liability insurance. See Tape
of Debate on H.F. 388 Before the Minnesota Senate (March 16, 1978).
The concern over the cost and availability of products liability insurance is not limited
to the Minnesota Legislature. At this writing two proposals aimed at the "products liabil-
ity crisis" have been introduced into Congress. See S. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REc. S 1735 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1977) (sponsored by Senators John C. Culver (Iowa) and
Gaylord Nelson (Wisconsin), calling for the creation of a temporary reinsurance pool for
small businesses); S. 403, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S 1185 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1977) (sponsored by Senator James B. Pearson (Kansas), providing for reinsurance to
products liability insurers and qualifying insurance companies). In addition, at least nine
states have established commissions to study all aspects of the products liability crisis.
See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REv. 643,
644 n.3 (1978).
A comprehensive analysis of the "products liability crisis" was recently completed by
the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability under the aegis of the United States
Department of Commerce. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODucT LIABILITv (1977). The preliminary conclusions of the Task Force were that there
is no crisis in product liability insurance, that no large sector of manufacturers is unable
to obtain insurance, and the increased cost of insurance accounts for less than one percent
of sales. See id., Briefing Report, at ii. Because the Task Force found little evidence of a
crisis in insurance rates, legislatures should be wary of effecting major changes in the strict
liability doctrine in the name of the "products liability insurance crisis."
299. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976) (amended 1978), which states in part: "When
there are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in
proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that
51
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fore the effective date of the comparative fault statute, the burden of a
co-tortfeasor's insolvency is placed entirely on the solvent co-
tortfeasors.3" Courts have justified this result based on the policy of
permitting as much recovery as possible to the injured party . 30 This
justification, however, loses force when the injured party is not free from
fault because the injured party's equities are no greater than the co-
tortfeasor's.32
Under the comparative fault statute, therefore, loss that would have
been allocated to an insolvent co-tortfeasor is redistributed to the in-
jured party and the remaining co-tortfeasors according to their relative
degrees of fault.30 By dividing the insolvent tortfeasors' liability propor-
tionately between the injured party and the remaining co-tortfeasors
according to their relative degrees of fault, the injured party is not left
totally uncompensated for the insolvent co-tortfeasor's share, and the
remaining co-tortfeasors are not required to shoulder the entire damage
attributable to the fault of the insolvent co-tortfeasor °4 This compro-
each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award." This language was
stricken from section 604.01, subdivision 1 in 1978. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6,
1978 Minn. Laws 839. Similar language was added to section 604.02: "When two or more
persons are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage
of fault attributable to each, except that each is jointly and severally liable for the whole
award." Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8(1), 1978 Minn. Laws 840 (to be codified as MINN.
STAT. § 604.02(1)).
300. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1976) (amended 1978). The comparative fault act
applies to all cases arising on or after April 15, 1978. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §
11, 1978 Minn. Laws 842.
301. See Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 218 Minn. 532, 540-41, 16 N.W.2d 758, 763-64
(1944); Comment, Comparative Negligence in California: Multiple Party Litigation, 7
PAC. L.J. 770, 776 (1976).
302. See Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act- What Should It Provide?, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 220, 231 (1977).
303. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8(2), 1978 Minn. Laws 840 (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2)).
304. An example will help clarify how the insolvent co-tortfeasor's loss is allocated





P's damages are $20,000. Each party's responsibility, according to their percentage of
negligence, is thus:
P: $2,000 (10% of $20,000)
D,: $6,000 (30% of $20,000)
D,: $12,000 (60% of $20,000)
Assume further that D is insolvent. Under the comparative negligence statute, P may
recovery $18,000 from D, because the burden of D,'s insolvency under that statute is
placed entirely on D,. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976) (amended 1978).
Under the comparative fault statute, however, D,'s share (60% of $20,000) must be
borne by P and D,, according to their respective percentages of fault. See Act of Apr. 5,
1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 840 (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2)). Thus,
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mise formulation fosters the underlying policy in a comparative fault
system of allocating loss in proportion to an individual's share of fault
that contributed to the injury."
Product liability suits are the only exception to allocating an insolvent
tortfeasor's share of liability under the comparative fault statute."6 In
product liability suits the new statute retains the prior rule that the
insolvent tortfeasor's liability will be apportioned only among co-
tortfeasors.107 This exception is justified because the policies supporting
P would bear one-fourth of D's share and D, would bear three-fourths of D,'s share.
The numerator in each fraction is the party's degree of fault and the denominator repre-
sents the combined fault of P and D. See Note, Reconciling Comparative Negligence,
Contribution, and Joint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1158, 1165 (1977).
305. Note, supra note 304, at 1170-71.
306. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8(3), 1978 Minn. Laws 840 (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. § 604.02(3)).
307. See id.
Indicative of the Legislature's desire to give special treatment to injured parties who
bring product liability claims is the apparent legislative intent to allow aggregation of
damages in such claims. The resolution of the aggregation issue is extremely significant
because it may determine whether an injured party will be entitled to any compensation.
Under Minnesota's comparative fault law, if the plaintiff's percentage of fault is greater
than that of any co-tortfeasor, the plaintiff cannot collect from those co-tortfeasors but
only from the co-tortfeasor whose fault was equal to or greater than the plaintiff's. Gener-
ally, when each co-tortfeasors' fault is less than the plaintiff's, the plaintiff will recover
nothing for the injury, even though the total fault of the co-tortfeasors, when their individ-
ual percentages are combined, is greater than the plaintiff's percentage of fault. See
Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (1973). The Marier
court prohibited aggregation based on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's construction of that
state's comparativenegligence statute, from which Minnesota's comparative negligence
statute was adopted. See id. at 244-46, 207 N.W.2d at 708-09. The Wisconsin court,
however, has since indicated a willingness to change its interpretation of the comparative
negligence statute, stating that comparing the negligence of the individual plaintiff to that
of each defendant rather than permitting aggregation leads to harsh and unfair results.
See May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 38-39, 264 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1978). If the co-
tortfeasors' fault can be aggregated, the injured party will be entitled to the percentage
of damage equal to the aggregate percentage of the co-tortfeasors' fault. See Krengel v.
Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 210, 203 N.W.2d 841, 847 (1973).
An examination of the legislative history of the aggregation-related portions of the
comparative fault statute indicates that the Legislature intended to prohibit aggregation
only in those situations in which aggregation previously was prohibited under the compar-
ative negligence statute. See Tape of Debate on H.F. 388 Before the Minnesota Senate
(March 16, 1978). Because legislative discussion regarding aggregation under Minnesota's
comparative fault statute did not include examples involving co-tortfeasors in a product
liability chain of distribution, an argument can be made that the Legislature intended
that aggregation should be permitted in product liability cases. See id.
In addition to the legislative history indicating an intent to allow aggregation in product
liability cases, several compelling reasons require the allowance of aggregation in such
cases.
First, a product chain of distribution is remarkably similar to a joint venture or a joint
duty theory that has been used by the Minnesota court to permit aggregation of percen-
tages of negligence. See Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203
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product liability suits require that injured consumers be given as much
N.W.2d 841 (1973). Although each member of the chain may work independently, the end
result is that the consumer is presented with one product and not the separate products
of three or four co-tortfeasors. The members of the product chain of distribution all
contribute money and effort to a common undertaking. Common contractual control over
piioducts usually exists, and, in most instances, every member of the chain shares in any
profits. Moreover, the economic reality of a single association, acting as a sales chain of
distribution, should not be obscured by a lawsuit that involves co-tortfeasors with differ-
ent corporate names. See Comment, Torts: Joint Venturers' Negligence Must Be Com-
bined Under the Minnesota Comparative Negligence Statute, 58 MINN. L. REv. 978, 982-
83 (1974).
Second, if aggregation is not allowed, the policies behind imposing strict liability on
sellers of defective products will be severely frustrated. For a list of policy reasons support-
ing strict liability, see note 308 infra.
Finally, the nature of comparative fault in a product liability suit requires the jury to
compare the injured party's causal fault to the defective condition of the product. See City
of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 651 nn.9-10, 207 N.W.2d
866, 870-71 nn.9-10 (1973) (special jury verdict indicates that an injured party's fault is
to be compared to the defective condition of the product). Thus, in those situations
involving "a claim arising from the manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product"
aggregation should be allowed. Such a result permits the sophisticated comparative fault
statute to exist in harmony with the policies supporting the strict liability doctrine.
Permitting aggregation also would appear to reconcile the conflicting policies of barring
an injured party from recovering against a co-tortfeasor whose fault is less than the injured
party's and that of spreading the costs of injuries caused by defective products.
Whether aggregation should be permitted among co-tortfeasors in a product liability
chain of distribution apparently never has been addressed directly by the courts for three
basic reasons. First, comparative negligence concepts originated relatively recently. See
generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.4 (1974) (indicating that prior to 1969
only seven states had comprehensive comparative negligence laws). Second, prior to
Busch v. Busch Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), comparative negligence con-
cepts generally were not aplied in product liability cases. Only the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461-62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967), had
applied its state's comparative negligence law in products liability cases. Third, until
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn. -, 255 N.W.2d 362 (1977), parties lower in
the chain of distribution than manufacturers, such as retailers and wholesalers, could
obtain indemnification from manufacturers of defective parts. See Sorenson v. Safety
Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361-62, 216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974). But see Frey v. Montgo-
mery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977) (Kelly, J., concurring specially).
Assuming that aggregation is proper under the comparative fault statute, the following
example indicates how contribution claims should be allocated. Consider a situation in
which the plaintiff, a bystander, is injured by an automobile that has defective brakes.
The automobile's owner knew or should have known that the brakes were defective. The
injured party sues the automobile owner, the automobile manufacturer, and the brake
manufacturer. The jury returns a special verdict with the following findings:
Plaintiff-30% at fault
Automobile owner-20% at fault
Automobile manufacturer-25% at fault
Brake manufacturer-25% at fault
The plaintiff should be able to recover 50% of his damages, and the automobile and
brake manufacturers should each contribute 25% of the total damages suffered. The
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compensation as possible. A
2. Statutory Changes Affecting Indemnity Claims
The new comparative fault statute broadly defines "fault" as:
acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward
the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person
to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, un-
reasonable assumption of risk not consituting an express consent, mis-
use of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to
mitigate damages."
With the exception of minor changes, this definition is taken from
section 1(b) of the Proposed Uniform Comparative Fault Act.3 10 This
broad definition codifies Tolbert's and Busch's underlying rationales:
allocation of loss must be based upon the co-tortfeasors' relative fault .
3
1
Therefore, in a multi-party lawsuit, if one co-tortfeasor's liability is
based on a theory of negligence and another co-tortfeasor's liability is
based on strict liability or breach of an implied warranty, loss allocation
automobile owner, not being a member of the chain of distribution, is not required to
contribute any money to the injured party.
308. The policies supporting product liability suits include protecting consumer reli-
ance that results from modem merchandising methods, see Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Iowa 1972); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn.
322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St.
244, 248-49, 147 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1958), allocating loss to the superior risk and cost bearing
abilities of sellers, see Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65,207 A.2d 305,
312 (1965) ("The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage
... is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels of trade, rather
than by the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect them-
selves."), and encouraging production of safe products, see McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,
278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967).
309. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 840 (to be codified as MINN.
STAT. § 604.01(la)).
310. The UNIFORM COMPARATVE FAULT Acr § 1 states:
In an action for injury to person or property, based on negligence [of any
kind], recklessness, [wanton misconduct,] strict liability or breach of war-
ranty, or a tort action based on a statute unless otherwise indicated by the
statute, any contributory fault on the part of, or attributed to, the claimant, or
of any other person whose fault might otherwise have affected the claimant's
recovery, does not bar the recovery but diminishes the award of compensatory
damages proportionately, according to the measure of fault attributed to the
claimant. This Section applies whether the contributory fault previously consti-
tuted a defense or not, and replaces previous common law and statutory rules
concerning the effect of contributory fault, including last clear chance and un-
reasonable assumption of risk.
The Uniform Act was passed to avoid the "all-or-nothing" approach previously utilized
under the common law method of contributory negligence. Even common law exceptions
such as last clear chance did not negate the overall unfairness to particular parties. See
Wade, supra note 302, at 223.
311. See notes 264-67 supra and accompanying text.
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should be based in proportion to the jury's findings of causal fault re-
gardless of the specific type of fault alleged. Accordingly, to the extent
that Frey stands for the proposition that a co-tortfeasor is automatically
entitled to indemnity when another co-tortfeasor breaches an implied
warranty, that decision is inconsistent with the new comparative fault
statute.' Hendrickson's third rule, therefore, should not be interpreted
as allowing a co-tortfeasor indemnity merely because another co-
tortfeasor has breached an implied warranty. Hendrickson's first and
second rules, however, remain viable under the new statute as those
rules allow indemnity only when the indemnitee is free of fault.3 1
Hendrickson's fifth rule also remains viable because the new statute
does not cover contractual indemnity."'
V. CONCLUSION
Under our present system of tort liability an equitable method of loss
allocation is necessary to handle problems created by multi-party law-
suits. Unfortunately, the use of contribution and indemnity to allocate
loss has been characterized as being in a clouded and confused state 1 5
The changes in loss allocation concepts brought about by the recent
upheaval indicates, however, that much of the confusion surrounding
the historical anachronisms, semantic absurdities, and mechanical rules
appears to have ended because allocation of loss based on relative fault
is now the rule in Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court's holdings
in Lam bertson, Tolbert, and Busch are a strong indication that regard-
less of the legal theories involved loss will be allocated on relative fault
principles. The court's decision in Frey, however, injects uncertainty
into this loss allocation concept. Accordingly, the decision in Frey
should be reexamined to determine whether it is consistent with the
trend in recent decisions that loss should be allocated between co-
tortfeasors in proportion to their relative fault. Once this apparent in-
consistency is clarified, Minnesota's loss allocation system will be on the
threshold of being equitable as well as practical. Hopefully, the sugges-
tions proposed by this Note will help guide the court past this threshold
and into the forefront of a more enlightened loss allocation system.
312. For an examination of Frey and its effect on Rule 3, see notes 282-96 supra and
accompanying text.
313. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - Minn .... 255 N.W.2d 362, 366-68
(1977).
314. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 839 (to be codified as
MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02).
315. See Jensvold, supra note 6, at 736, 738.
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